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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the impact of environmental dependent risk on disease
dynamics within a Lagrangian modeling perspective; where the identity (defined by
place of residency) of individuals is preserved throughout the epidemic process. In
Chapter Three, the impact of individuals who refuse to be vaccinated is explored.
MMR vaccination and birth rate data from the State of California are used to de-
termine the impact of the anti-vaccine movement on the dynamics of growth of the
anti-vaccine sub-population. Dissertation results suggest that under realistic Califor-
nia social dynamics scenarios, it is not possible to revert the influence of anti-vaccine
contagion. In Chapter Four, the dynamics of Zika virus are explored in two highly
distinct idealized environments defined by a parameter that models highly distinctive
levels of risk, the result of vector and host density and vector control measures. The
underlying assumption is that these two communities are intimately connected due
to economics with the impact of various patterns of mobility being incorporated via
the use of residency times. In short, a highly heterogeneous community is defined by
its risk of acquiring a Zika infection within one of two “spaces,” one lacking access to
health services or effective vector control policies (lack of resources or ignored due to
high levels of crime, or poverty, or both). Low risk regions are defined as those with
access to solid health facilities and where vector control measures are implemented
routinely. It was found that the better connected these communities are, the existence
of communities where mobility between risk regions is not hampered, lower the over-
all, two patch Zika prevalence. Chapter Five focuses on the dynamics of tuberculosis
(TB), a communicable disease, also on an idealized high-low risk set up. The impact
of mobility within these two highly distinct TB-risk environments on the dynamics
and control of this disease is systematically explored. It is found that collaboration
and mobility, under some circumstances, can reduce the overall TB burden.
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Chapter 1
COMPLEXITY OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES
The use of mathematical models in the study of disease dynamics have been use-
ful in estimating the course of recent epidemics. In essence, the usefulness of the
models is based on whether the models are able to incorporate key factors that ulti-
mately decided the course of the epidemic even when these are incorporated as mere
assumptions. For this, one can conclude that the ultimate goal of a mathematical
model should be to develop hypotheses about the communities affected rather than
to predict the outcome of an epidemic. The case of the 2009 N1H1 epidemic solely
depended in the realization that the contacts between individuals could be described
by a periodic function (Towers and Feng, 2009). In this case, hypothesizing a sec-
ondary wave of infection was invaluable, but a social or abiotic interpretation as the
cause of the second wave would have had a bigger impact for global public health.
Similarly, in the case of Ebola in West Africa, the early stages of the epidemic were
analyzed and resulted in a close estimate in the final epidemic size (Towers et al.,
2014). While this result was useful, their biggest contribution was their observations
in regards to the epidemic growth, it grew exponentially. This observation led to a
possible connection between the implementation of cordon sanitaire (a medieval con-
trol strategy) and the explosion of the epidemic in August 2014; corroborated by the
work in (Espinoza et al., 2016). These are only two recent examples in which models
served as a tool to identify the existence of ignored factors driving these outbreaks of
disease, but there are many more.
The complexity of infectious diseases combined with limited information about
their dynamics create a tremendous challenge on the effective use of mathematical
1
models. In general, this complexity often arises from the impact of social and abiotic
factors. It is expected that social heterogeneity could have a direct impact in the risk
of infection, but since little is known, it is often ignored in mathematical models. In
the case of new diseases, in which little to none is known about their dynamics or
their long lasting consequences, it is paramount to determine important transmission
factors in order to create adequate time frames for the implementation of control
measures. In addition, exogenous factors like current conditions as well as social
behavior of the affected communities need to be taken in to account since they have the
potential to magnify the final size of the outbreak. Furthermore, an understanding of
the composition of the at-risk population should be the first priority since controlling a
disease outbreak depends mainly on their cooperation and secondly on the availability
of resources and infrastructure.
The aforementioned characteristics require a mathematical model where the incor-
poration of risk of infection heterogeneity is one of the main drivers of the dynamical
system. This heterogeneity can be expressed in many forms ranging from age struc-
ture to differences in vector-host ratios to more individualized forms, like for instance,
population adaptive behavior. All of which translate into a higher or lower expected
number of contacts per individual and are usually directly reflected in the basic re-
productive number; which gives us an early idea about the course of the outbreak.
In consequence, individuals might experience different levels of the risk of infection
based on factors predetermined by their community. In short, in order to identify the
main factors driving disease dynamics, the ideal approach is to have a clear under-
standing of key aspects of the at-risk population and the specific process of disease
transmission, that is, a clear understanding of biotic, abiotic and social factors. In
some cases, it is crucial to understand the ecosystem in which this population lives,
particularly when the disease studied involves zoonoses or vectors. A community
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with an abundance of reservoirs and vectors increases the exposure probability of
humans to reservoirs or vectors, and we can reasonably assume that individuals in
the community are more likely to have a higher number of zoonotic contacts than
average. Consequently, we expect such communities to have a higher risk of infection
and therefore their existence are a cause for public health concern.
It is clear that while abiotic and biotic factors determine the basic dynamics of
disease, social factors determine their spread. Most specifically, social factors influ-
ence the probability of contacts between susceptible and infectious individuals. In
particular, membership in social and ethnic groups that allow participation in social
activities and or associated ethnic customs used to be cultural barriers as a result
of distance, nowadays, easily broken by affordable travel. These factors in the ab-
sence of travel create a nonrandom mixing within these membership clusters, which
on their own, have many consequences on their epidemic spread ranging from time
of introduction to the severity of an epidemic (Sattenspiel and Dietz, 1995). Incor-
porating constant travel by tourist visiting these areas only increases the probability
of an effective contact and thus a greater and longer epidemic.
Today, it is difficult to find communities that are not interconnected, meaning
completely isolated. Hence, models that do not account for social and abiotic fac-
tors specific to the at-risk population are not likely to be useful in designing policies
that could help eradicate disease and most importantly prevent transmission. Like-
wise, policies that ignore these social and abiotic factors, or attributes of the at-risk
population, are unlikely to be effective. It should be clear that without a complete
description of the attributes of the community in question, it is almost impossible
to implement successful intervention programs that are capable of reducing transmis-
sion rates. Furthermore, failure to understand the attributes of the at-risk population
jeopardizes the success of intervention programs due to the fact that intervention pro-
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grams must educate both the at-risk population as well as their government officials
on the benefits, factors, and costs associated with population-based disease preven-
tion and control. Lastly, intervention programs must account for the risks that are
inherent with high levels of migration as well as with local and regional mobility
patterns between areas defined by risk heterogeneity.
Our ability to accurately interpret the social and abiotic factors, directly effect
the response time in the critically early stages of an epidemic. Consequently, the
development and implementation of interventions can greatly benefit in the form
of training and educational programs for governmental personnel in order to avoid
stigmatization and further marginalization of groups. A lack of an accurate analysis
is known to promote isolation, prevent integration, and reduce compliance (Gushulak
and MacPherson, 2000a), and as a result many experience some kind of discrimina-
tion. A situation that is not uncommon in today’s world where the role of dramatic
changes in initial conditions could easily be described by the displacement of large
groups of individuals, which cause catastrophes, conflicts, and generate new migra-
tion patterns in the process. Failure to adequately incorporate and address these
challenges may result in considerable delays and increase epidemic impact.
1.1 The Possible Role of Abiotic, Biotic, and Social Factors in the Spread of
Disease Epidemics.
Currently, disease outbreak analysis depends mainly on the dynamics of how a
pathogen affects humans directly. In particular, the main emphasis focuses on the
different kinds of transmission for such pathogen; it often relies on the interaction
among humans and in some cases between humans and animals (vectors). Nonethe-
less, many important factors are ignored and many of these factors have the potential
of magnifying disease proliferation and can lead to the regional endemicity of new
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diseases. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), it is
estimated that at least 6 out of every 10 infectious diseases in humans are zoonotic
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (b), 2016). Human interaction with
animals may consist of farming for food, interactions at zoos or fairs, family pets,
or in extreme cases, wild encounters; the latter usually as a result of deforestation
for construction purposes. Commonly, people acquire zoonotic diseases when coming
in contact with body fluids, get bitten, or by eating unsafe products from infected
animals.
Zoonotic infections are the origin of most established pathogens in humans, usually
transmitting rapidly in immunologically naive communities. Zoonotic infections are
a cause for concern due to their potential for devastating consequences, take for
instance the SARS epidemic in Canada, the 2009 N1H1 global epidemic and more
recently, the West Africa Ebola outbreak. Furthermore, spillover events could lead
to the adaptation of pathogens in humans and often making horizontal transmission
possible without the need for a reservoir. This shows the importance of monitoring
spillover diseases since repeated events could help the pathogen evolve from stage 1
(animal-animal) to stage 5 (human-human without the need of a reservoir), based on
the scale presented in (Wolfe et al., 2007). This is exactly what has been happening
with Ebola, human to human transmission has been growing and while it is considered
stage 4 since the epidemic still requires a reservoir, but Ebola was considered stage 3
in 2007 when (Wolfe et al., 2007) was published.
Zoonotic spillovers and their spread are a serious threat to global public health
since they are no longer confined to remote regions (Iacono et al., 2016). Again, the
case of Ebola in West Africa exemplifies this to perfection. During the last forty
years, there has been multiple outbreaks with none of them reaching 1000 cases until
the 2014 West Africa outbreak, in which over 28,000 people were infected and over
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11,000 died. Comparing the previous outbreaks with the latter, points to population
size and density as a potential factor for large outbreaks. In the past, Ebola was
confined only to humans, the population size was small, and the epidemic was termi-
nated locally; likely due to the high disease induced mortality rates as well as a very
limited pool of susceptible individuals. In a large and dense population, disease can
persist, travel to adjacent regions and eventually return once the susceptible popula-
tion gets replenished. Nonetheless, small populations also have the potential to host
persisting diseases as well. Small population with transmission between reservoirs
and humans, short immunity periods, and long infectious periods are among some of
the characteristics that will ensure a long disease outbreak (Wolfe et al., 2007).
Since most major epidemics involve abiotic, biotic, and social factors, it is im-
portant to have a rich understanding of the different biological, environmental, and
socio-economic factors responsible for spillovers and thus epidemic spread (Iacono
et al., 2016). Recent studies have been trying to explain the impact of these factors
on disease spread but unfortunately, most of them are arbitrary or specific to only a
single factor. Environmentally speaking, most studies focus on the impact that could
come as a consequence of climate change. In particular, for any zoonotic disease, the
growth rate of reservoirs is of great importance. A possible consequence of climate
change is the acceleration of biomass growth when temperatures rises; this could be
an explanation of why there are so many species living in the tropics. In particular, in
the case of vectors, which might be a factor that amplifies disease proliferation, their
natural life cycle is accelerated at the earlier stages, and their survival probability is
negatively affected. It would seem like climate change favors the shift rather than
the spread of epidemics. While the spread of the distribution of epidemics can be
attributed to social factors that increase disease sustainability, the abiotic factors like
climate change have the ability to increase the severity of diseases like malaria by
6
increasing the length of the transmission season (Lafferty, 2009). When the acceler-
ated growth coincides with an epidemic, then the consequences could be catastrophic.
Keep in mind that seasonality could also be a factor, because, it doesn’t always de-
pend only on climate. Sometimes abundance doesn’t affect or amplify an epizootic,
particularly if there is none in the beginning; its magnitude will depend on how late in
the season it starts. Events like El Nin˜o might have similar effects, since it promotes
growth in the mosquito population. In addition, the disease season might have an
earlier start reaching catastrophic proportions (Lafferty, 2009).
Furthermore, extinction or predator depletion promotes vector population growth.
In the case of mosquitoes, common ways of reaching predator depletion levels are
through drought or ecosystem degradation, often caused by humans. Once an ecosys-
tem has been damaged and mosquito predator numbers have been depleted, minimal
water accumulations are enough for mosquito eggs to hatch and larvae is free to
grow at a logistic rate without experiencing any harvesting and thus able to reach
a maximum population size. If abundance of mosquitoes and a mosquito-borne dis-
ease endemic to the region, and the lag is not long enough, then it will result in
a huge outbreak. This scenario could be the case of Malaria in Africa or Dengue
fever (DENV) in many places. At the same time, habitat destruction might be the
main factor responsible for the shifts in distribution of species (Lafferty, 2009). In
the case of vector borne diseases, it is capable of increasing the epidemic toll since
this exposes new populations with little resistance to these diseases and thus higher
mortality rates.
In the case of malaria, the latest increase on disease burden has been attributed
to new population mobility patterns, changes in agricultural practices, irrigation
schemes, dam construction, deforestation, weakening of public health systems, and
climate change (Sachs and Malaney, 2002). A small amount of empirical evidence
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suggests that nature is capable of delivering public health benefits. Bauch et. al using
a combination of of municipal-level data set on diseases that includes public health
services, conservation policies, climate factors, demographics and other drivers of land
use, were able to show a negative correlation in the frequencies between malaria and
other diseases with an area that is under strict environmental protection in the Brazil-
ian Amazon. Moreover, their results also suggest that malaria occurrences would be
reduced by expanding these strict environmental protected areas and incidence levels
could be reduced even further if the construction of roads and mining practices are
restricted (Bauch et al., 2015). This suggests that the implementation of ecological
conservation practices aimed at preserving the natural capital of these at-risk regions
can deliver co-benefits by increasing human health and therefore increasing human
capital (Bauch et al., 2015).
In many cases, it is known that diseases are able to create both a social and
an economic burden for the affected communities. Diseases like tuberculosis, HIV
and malaria are thought to have a direct impact on the economies of those countries
with heavy disease burden. Due to the high number of casualties they cause, it is
believed that the impact it creates in human capital is great enough to prevent eco-
nomic growth in the affected region. Furthermore, the effects of these diseases are
suspected to affect these countries by preventing population growth, work produc-
tivity and savings or investments as a result of medical costs. In many cases, child
nutrition plays a major role, as well as deaths caused by disease outbreaks since both
usually prevent labor productivity. While these direct consequences are important,
it is also imperative to think and explore the direct consequences that arise from
overcrowding in the context of disease incidence, prevalence and amplification. These
kind of conditions preventing economic growth are believed to create poverty traps.
Using deterministic models, it is believed to be impossible to escape poverty traps
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without substantial external changes impacting the existing conditions (Bonds et al.,
2010). On the other hand, the work of Plucinski et. al suggests that the efficient
implementation of control measures could create small changes in the probability of
leaving or escaping the poverty trap. These changes via externally enforced levels
of improved health or economic conditions will ultimately guarantee an escape from
poverty traps even when the control measure or safety net is within the basin of at-
traction of the poverty trap (Plucin´ski et al., 2011). This reinforces the importance
of understanding the attributes of the community in an attempt to analyze which
control measure, whether economic or medical, will have the most favorable impact
on a community.
Recently, control policies have been focusing on motivating people to take pre-
ventive measures. For instance, during the 2009 N1H1 epidemic, Mexican authorities
recommended people to stay in their homes for an entire week since it is known that
person to person contacts are the ones that drive human disease (Althaus and Schiller,
2009). Similarly, during the recent Zika virus (ZIKV) outbreak, people were recom-
mended to practice safe sex in order to prevent an elevated number of mycrocephaly
cases in the Americas. Lastly, in the southern United States, local governments were
authorized to pay residents $20 for testing themselves for TB, another $20 for re-
turning two days after for the test check up, $20 for keeping an appointment for a
chest X-ray if tested positive, and finally $100 for completing the treatment if they
had active TB (Blinder, 2016). It is believed that if people takes into account the
trade-offs that drive person to person contact, they will ultimately make good de-
cisions or adaptive decisions during active disease outbreaks. It is suggested that
human adaptive behavior could significantly change the course of ongoing epidemics
(Fenichel et al., 2011). This suggest that prevention measures could be paramount in
disease control as long as you have a well educated population in which the majority
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of the individuals are able to assess contact trade-offs whether they are based on a
profit or a health perception, particularly during active disease outbreaks in or close
to endemic areas.
Generally, having a complete understanding about the emergence and re-emergence
of infectious disease should be a public health priority. Current, efforts to control and
eradicate disease need to focus on determining factors specific to the at-risk com-
munities and policies in place; if any,are they increasing the spread of disease? The
existence of these factors (social, abiotic, and biotic) and their impact on disease
dynamics needs to be addressed in the study of infectious diseases. Ignoring these
factors might be detrimental in the implementation of control measures because so-
cial and abiotic factors could become catalysts for biotic factors that ultimately may
magnify the proliferation of a disease. Ecological degradation could be an example
that is capable of directly promoting the spread of vector borne diseases like DENV
and Malaria. The combination of social, abiotic, and biotic knowledge helps deter-
mine the risk of infection as well as the risk of a spillover event. Unfortunately, due
to the complexity of these rare events it is hard to measure and forecast spillover
events. The need of a framework that incorporates abiotic, biotic, and social factors
with mathematical models would be of tremendous help in explaining the constant
emergence and reemergence of epizootics.
1.2 The Emergence and Reemergence of Arboviral Diseases
Arboviral diseases are those viruses that need a blood sucking arthropod (vector)
to complete their life cycle. Typically, arboviruses are zoonoses that depend on a
host (vertebrate) for replication and to reach ecosystem endemicity. The most im-
portant hosts or reservoirs are birds and rodents while the most important vectors are
mosquitoes and ticks. According to the International Catalog of Arboviruses, there
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are 537 registered viruses, of which about 214 are recognized as known or probable
arboviruses and about 134 have caused illness in humans (Gubler, 2002).
Between 1970 and 2000, we have witnessed the emergence of over 100 new viruses.
The majority of them are zoonoses that as a result of social and abiotic factors have
been able to jump species and infect humans. While few of these new pathogens are
arboviruses and all are considered unimportant for humans from a public health point
of view, the recent Zika virus (ZIKV) outbreak made us reconsider their importance.
Importance is determined by the level of viremia the pathogen is able to produce
in humans. Most arboviruses of importance belong to three families: Flaviviridae,
Togaviridae and Bunyaviridae (Gubler, 2002). During thesame period, the world has
witnessed the resurgence of arboviral diseases that were thought to be well under
control like Dengue fever (DENV), Chikungunya (CHIKV), West Nile Fever and
Yellow Fever. DENV and CHIKV produce high levels of viremia and in fact, DENV
is one of the few arboviruses that has completely adapted to humans and established
itself in those large tropical urban communities and no longer requires a sylvatic
reservoir (Gubler, 2002).
Global dispersal of arboviruses could be attributed to the evolution of factors
that support their expansion: anthropological behavior, commercial transportation,
and land-remediation (Liang et al., 2015). In addition, the huge variety of avail-
able arthropods helps arboviruses thrive in tropical environments. Furthermore, the
adaptability of arthropods to change their meal preferences when host populations
decrease is a cause for concern and something that needs to be incorporated into
the development of control strategies, otherwise vector expansion will remain a chal-
lenge for future generations. This ability to modify meal preferences promotes the
accelerated expansion and colonization of new ecosystems rich in biomass diversity,
like the tropics. Incidentally, arthropod and migratory reservoir abundance facili-
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tates arbovirus dispersion through large regions. Finally, this abundance of possible
vectors and reservoirs allows arboviruses to survive in the sylvatic environment even
when it seems to have run its epidemic course. Alternatively, some arboviruses can
also survive in unhatched eggs for months or even years. For these reasons, arbovirus
reemergence is very possible and at the same time these survival strategies and others
not mentioned here make arbovirus eradication practically impossible.
Hence, control measures that only focus on humans and domestic reservoirs are
not likely to completely eradicate arboviruses since they could stay in their sylvatic
environment and eventually reemerge once the human population is replenished. This
will happen when reservoir surveillance is low or lacking. In addition, implementing
vector control in sylvatic environments has to be environment friendly since vector
control could destroy the ecosystem and bring catastrophic reactions. Nonetheless,
in the case of DENV it helps to have control measures that control the population
of aedes aegypti in urban and semi-urban areas. Currently, the best strategy is to
reduce exposure to vectors but the development of vaccines, treatment, and educa-
tion campaigns are among the top suggestions for addressing the main objectives for
arboviruses control (see (Liang et al., 2015) for a list of strategies).
While there are many diseases that have reemerged during the last couple of years,
Dengue fever (DENV) exemplifies a case that requires a new modeling approach and
hence customized control strategies. Even though DENV is an old disease initially
spreading globally as a result of commercial shipping during the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, and first became a major public health problem in most tropical
countries by the beginning of the 20th century, nowadays, it is still considered an
emergent disease. There are 4 different DENV serotypes (DEN-1, DEN-2, DEN-3,
and DEN-4) that have the same epidemiology. The dengue viruses are Flaviviruses
(family: Flaviviridae). During the 1950s and 1960s, DENV was controlled in most
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tropical countries (except in Southeast Asia) as a result of the efficient implementation
of control measures for malaria and yellow fever.
DENV or Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever (DHF) has once again become a major
public health problem. During the last part of the twentieth century, the American
tropics experienced a dramatic resurgence of DENV and the emergence of DHF.
DENV is one of the few arboviruses that has fully adapted to the human host and
their environment and no longer needs to maintain a sylvatic cycle, making DENV the
most important arboviral disease of humans. DENV maintains an endemic cycle (one
to four serotypes in the same human population) in large urban and suburban centers
throughout tropical and subtropical regions across Asia, Africa, Central America,
South America, and the Pacific where its principal vector, Aedes aegypti, thrives.
Due to its worldwide widespread, there are about 3 billion people at risk of a DENV
infection. It is estimated that each year there are at least 100 million DENV infections,
more than 250,000 cases of DHF and thousands of deaths. This goes without saying,
in many countries DHF is one of the leading causes of death in children.
Generally, DENV symptoms are mild and include fever, headache, eye pain, myal-
gia, arthralgia and rash and epidemics, while more severe diseases tend to cycle every
3 to 5 years. Nonetheless, during the 1950’s DENV began to show severe symptoms
characterized by defects in hemostasis and plasma leakage, which could lead to death
if not treated early. This new manifestation is known as the Dengue Hemorrhagic
Fever (DHF) and is one of the main reasons why DENV is a public health problem.
While current practices of dealing with DHF are to hospitalize individuals with early
signs, the lack of understanding about early determinants of DENV severity prevents
the implementation of an optimal cost-effective strategy. Hyperendemicity, the co-
circulation of various DENV serotypes, is the most common risk factor associated
with DHF in an area. While the factors responsible for hyperendemicity are not well
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understood, it is suspected that they are associated with the increased movement of
people between communities, existing levels of immunity to specific virus serotypes
in a given community, and genetic changes in circulating or introducing viruses.
Secondary DENV infections are more likely to produce DHF as a result of immune
enhancement. The binding of non-neutralizing antibodies from a previous DENV
infection with new infecting serotype facilitates the entry of virus to bearing cells.
This tends to increase the amounts of cells with antigen that could activate preexisting
DENV T lymphocytes from the primary DENV infection and ultimately lead to the
release of cytokines and other chemical mediators that could cause plasma leakage.
In addition, it is believed that certain pathological factors could play an important
role in the development of DHF, such factors include: risk factors (age, sex and
nutrition), population-specific genetic predisposition and increased immune response
due to a highly virulent genotype.
While there are no specific factors that could explain the sudden reemergence of
DENV during the waning years of the 20th century, there are certain trends that
could help us understand how particular factors could have contributed to its world-
wide proliferation. In particular, it is known that demographic and societal changes in
urban areas of the tropical developing world along with population movement within
these areas and the lack of mosquito control, tend to increase DENV disease incidence.
This change in epidemiology and reemergence of epidemic DENV are associated with
demographic and societal changes that occurred as a result of conflicts during the last
70 years. Without a doubt, World War II has been the most significant event that has
promoted the biggest population growth in this period. Consequently, this unprece-
dented growth has also driven urbanization factors that promoted mosquito growth
near human centers and hence DENV proliferation. Furthermore, transportation sys-
tems have also improved as a result of population growth directly impacting DENV
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distribution and transmission. Due to poor surveillance measures in place, modern
transportation facilitates the undetected introduction of new vectors and pathogens
into new geographic areas. The recent introductions of West Nile Virus in 1999 and
Zika Virus in 2014 to the western hemisphere corroborates the impact of transporta-
tion and the poor communication between public and animal health officials, which
leads to new pathogen discovery once a disease has been already established, making
it almost impossible to eliminate in some cases.
The complex dynamics of emergent and re-emergent diseases like DENV within
heterogeneous environments directly impacted by the effects of evolution, adaptive
human behaviors, and public health policies, highlight the need of mathematical
models to gain a better understanding of the transmission dynamics of arboviruses,
including the possible challenges that emerge in the context of sustainability and
human cooperation. Although there is a DENV vaccine which is currently being used
in many countries, DENV control still depends on prevention and vector control.
Unfortunately, there seems to be a complacency towards vector borne diseases to the
point that very few improvements or effective control measures have been developed
in the last couple of years. In addition, most countries have poor public health
infrastructure and disease surveillance needs to improve. Furthermore, if developing
countries have poor public infrastructure in regards to their dams, irrigation, sewer
and waste management systems, or if they have poor housing, and unreliable water
storage systems, it will be impossible to prevent the introduction and treatment of
new arboviral diseases.
It is crucial to know how these demographic and societal changes impact the use
of new control measures like vaccines and vector control. As a result, we will be using
mathematical models to explore how factors like mobility, population size and risk of
infection, which might be impacted by social factors, might impact the course of an
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outbreak.
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Chapter 2
MATHEMATICAL MODELS IN EPIDEMIOLOGY
The use of mathematical epidemiological models to study the evolution, dynamics,
and control of diseases has increased in the last century since the development of the
most celebrated epidemic model (SIR model) by Kermack and McKendrick in 1927.
While the iconic SIR model is useful, it also relies on many assumptions that are
questioned from time to time; take for instance population homogeneity. In addi-
tion, transmission depends completely on the intensity and frequency of encounters
(effective contacts) between susceptible and infected individuals. Nonetheless, its ap-
plicability to everyday problems along with the easy calculation of a reproduction
threshold (R0), makes it a powerful mechanism to create hypothesis that ultimately
could even change policies. R0 is the basic reproductive number or the average num-
ber of new infections an infectious individual causes during the average infectious
period in a completely susceptible population. Thus, an outbreak is possible when
R0 > 1 and the disease eventually collapses when R0 < 1. Due to its simplicity,
modifications of the SIR model has been used widely to explain social and natural
phenomena. Some examples include the study of the dynamics of antibiotic resistance
at the population level. In particular, persistence, evolution, and the expansion of re-
sistance to antibiotics are of great importance due to the limited number of antibiotic
drugs available. On the other hand, Michael Gladwell used the insights he had gained
from understanding the SIR model and applied them to explain crime epidemics in
a city. He saw crime as a contagion process and recognized the existence of a thresh-
old and significance of crossing this tipping point. The wide adaptability of the SIR
model along with the complexity of the problems at hand require a holistic approach
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and thus the collaboration of a multidisciplinary team is paramount in order to fully
address the problem in question.
2.1 Metapopulation Models
During the middle of the twentieth century, improvements in transportation, for
both leisure and commerce, made it possible for diseases to move from their endemic
regions and colonize new and completely susceptible regions in a rapid manner. As
a result, it is important to somehow incorporate travel when modeling epidemics;
depending on time scales and transmission dynamics of the disease. In particular, it
is essential to start modeling populations of populations (metapopulations) or patchy
environments with mobile individuals. These models are called metapopulation mod-
els which usually consist of a large system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations
with coupling interactions between patches (communities). The ideal scenario to
model the spread of a communicable disease would include all interacting patches
that could cause an infection. Many scenarios that incorporate the travel of indi-
viduals between communities could be found in (Arino et al., 2007; Arino and Van
Den Driessche, 2003; Arino and Van den Driessche, 2003; Arino and van den Driess-
che, 2006; Arino, 2009; Sattenspiel and Dietz, 1995; Allen et al., 2008; Hanski and
Gilpin, 1991).
Nonetheless, spatial heterogeneity along with different time scales require a model
approach in which infectious individuals are able to successfully infect susceptible
individuals from multiple patches, including their own. In (Sattenspiel and Dietz,
1995), an epidemic metapopulation model was used in which place of residence and
current location was tracked at any given time. It was assumed that, in a two patch
setting, Nij(t) represented the number of i-residents currently in j at time t in which
residents would travel at a per capita rate gi ≥ 0 and would return at the per capita
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rate rij ≥ 0 with r11 = r22 = 0. In essence, this scenario would be easily represented
in a directed graph and assumed to be strongly connected (significant travel rates).
Moreover, an infection process was added on top of the demography and a two patch
SIR model with constant population was formulated. In this case, it is assumed that
individuals on patch i on average have κi > 0 contacts and the proportion of effective
contacts is βikj > 0 in patch j for individuals from i being infected by infectious
individuals from k. In a strongly connected system at an equilibrium implies that
when one patch is at the disease free equilibrium (DFE), all patches are also at DFE.
Similarly, when one is at the endemic equilibrium (EE), all other patches are also at
EE. When not all patches are strongly connected, then only those that are strongly
connected would be at the same equilibrium. Interestingly, changes in the traveling
rates can reverse the stability of the DFE and EE (Arino and Van den Driessche,
2003, see Figure 3a). Meaning that traveling rates could have a big impact in the
course of a disease outbreak since they have the ability to stabilize and destabilize
the DFE.
While the model used in (Sattenspiel and Dietz, 1995) is a good way to model some
epidemics it is clear that for highly complex diseases like measles, simulations would
be challenging due to the amounts of required data, particularly, the way in which
the population gets structured. In addition, modeling diseases like SARS in which
infectious individuals also travel could be a great application but again a great deal of
data would be required, not to mention the difference of time scales between disease
dynamics and travel rates. However, insights from simple metapopulation models
could be of great benefit in the understanding of global disease spread. Nonetheless
spatial heterogeneity along with different time scales require a metapopulation model
approach in which infectious individuals are able to successfully infect susceptibles
from multiple patches without explicitly incorporating the movement of individuals
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nor the concept of contacts.
2.2 Lagrangian Models: A New Approach
In this dissertation, a new approach for modeling disease dynamics is used, at-
tempting to analyze the main factors driving disease spread. It is known that disease
spread is facilitated by human (or in some cases reservoir) travel. The proposed ap-
proach tries to incorporate social factors, or their consequences, that modify the av-
erage pathogen transmission rates of communities. In addition, it uses a Lagrangian
approach to keep track of individuals when they don’t spend all their time in one
particular community. Furthermore, population size heterogeneity is also considered
since overcrowding, in some cases like vector borne diseases, could accelerate the
spread of outbreaks.
This approach will ultimately require the use of social ecological tools, well known
in resource allocation, in order to incorporate the direct impact of social factors into
the transmission rates of individual communities. In particular, risk heterogeneity
is studied here by assuming that social factors like violence, poverty, and lack of
resources heavily burden a community, while good access to disease control measures,
health care facilities, and availability of resources to minimize local crime and violence
are the norm in one or more neighboring communities. Characteristics that are not
foreign to conflict zones and neighboring communities in most developing countries
heavily burdened by disease outbreaks.
2.2.1 Residence Times
In (Mossong et al., 2008), the authors suggest the need of analyzing the clus-
tering of individuals during the start of an epidemic. This is clearly what the new
modeling approach (Lagrangian approach) in mathematical epidemiology is trying to
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do. Nonetheless, even when more information about the different kinds of contacts
is known, there are scenarios in which counter intuitive results are obtained. One
would suggest that in a very congested area, TB would proliferate but this is not
always the case. It also seems as most infections are generated at home. This could
be because of our behavior towards strangers is more protective than towards our
own family members. Perhaps, because in a congested public area, such as a train,
we tend to modify our behavior to adhere to the norm or equilibrium established by
the majority. Meaning that, depending on the place we find ourselves, we will have
different behaviors and thus different risks of infections completely determined by the
overall behavior of that place (cluster or patch).
Since the concept of contacts or effective contacts during an epidemic outbreak
is somewhat ambiguous, in this section a different perspective will be used; one that
indirectly keeps track of individuals. In particular, the proportion of time in a given
unit (usually a day) an individual spends in a specific environment is explored. Due
to the heterogeneity found in neighboring communities or even neighborhoods sug-
gests the need to have a system that describes contagion depending on where an
individual spends his/her time. In this case, heterogeneity is expressed as the level
of risk of infection inherent to each environment or community. This method in-
corporates both the process of contagion while at the same time, it incorporates in
an indirect way the spread of disease between interconnected environments via the
visitation of individuals for leisure or work. At the same time it is assumed that
the initial conditions of each individual environment promotes disease transmission
heterogeneously. When considering epidemic models in a two environment (patches)
setting, it is usually assumed that one has a significantly higher risk of infection and
that individuals of both patches perform short term trips between the two patches
without loosing their identity. By quantifying the average time an individual spends
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in each patch (residence time) allows to indirectly track individuals, that is, following
a Lagrangian perspective as shown in Figure 2.1 (Bichara et al., 2015; Bichara and
Castillo-Chavez, 2016). Notice that most models that incorporate mobility use an
Eulerian perspective that describes migration between the patches.
Figure 2.1: Dispersal of Individuals via a Lagrangian Approach.
Assuming that residents from Patch i spend a proportion of their time in Patch j
(pij) and the rest of their time in their patch of origin, then for a two patch system
p11 + p12 = 1, p21 + p22 = 1.
Similarly, the risk of infection in Patch i is βi, and assuming that Patch 1 is the
riskiest then β1 > β2 (for a two patch system). Notice that in this case susceptible
individuals could get infected in either patch. In particular, susceptibles from Patch
1 present in Patch 1 (p11S1) could get infected from infectious individuals present in
Patch 1 from any of the other patches. Similarly, susceptibles from Patch 1 present in
Patch 2 (p12S1) could get infected from infectious individuals present in Patch 2 from
any of the other patches. Following the same construction, the number of infectives in
Patch 1 at a given time is determined by the sum of the infectives from both patches
at that specific time, that is:
p11I1(t) + p21I2(t),
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while the total number of individuals in Patch 1 is:
p11N1 + p21N2.
Thus the density of infected individuals in Patch 1 at time t, that is, the effective
infectious proportion in Patch 1 is:
p11I1(t) + p21I2(t)
p11N1 + p21N2
.
Hence, the rate of new infections of members of Patch 1 in Patch 1 is:
β1p11S1
p11I1(t) + p21I2(t)
p12N1 + p22N2
,
and the rate of new infections of members of Patch 1 in Patch 2 is:
β2p12S1
p12I1(t) + p22I2(t)
p11N1 + p21N2
.
Similarly, the rate of new infections for individuals from Patch 2 can be found. Notice
that the infectious in Patch i are only able to infect susceptible individuals present
in Patch i.
As expected, the calculation of the basic reproduction number (using the next
generation matrix approach as in (Van den Driessche and Watmough, 2002)) and the
final epidemic size are quite complicated. Nonetheless, the special case:
p11 = p22 = 1, p12 = p21 = 0,
in the absence of mobility is extremely useful, again for a two patch system. Modifying
the residence times for both patches would allow to estimate the effect of certain
mobility patterns or imposed travel restrictions, defined by all the residence times pij
from the system (mobility matrix P), on the final epidemic size.
While this approach helps incorporate some of the main types of heterogeneity
influencing the spread of disease, a more advanced mathematical background or data
availability is required in order to analyze more complex scenarios for instance, het-
erogeneity caused by the age of individuals.
23
Chapter 3
ANTI-VACCINE MOVEMENT: A SOCIAL CONTAGION
Vaccines and their impact on morbidity and mortality rates from infectious diseases
are commonly considered one of the greatest public health success stories (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (g), 2011). Nonetheless, there has been a growing
anti-vaccine movement likely leading to a rise in incidence of highly preventable dis-
eases such as measles. Anti-vaccine dialogue is prevalent both in celebrity culture and
on the Internet. In this chapter, a compartmental model to study the anti-vaccine
movement as a social contagion was developed. The model is then fit to population,
birth rates, and vaccination rates data focusing on California, using time series data
covering 19 years starting in 1995. The best fit model has good agreement with the
data providing insight into the dynamics of the anti-vaccine movement.
3.1 Introduction
Infectious diseases have been a challenge for our society and a major factor shaping
the history of man (Black et al., 1977). According to the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC), vaccines and their impact on infection and morbidity/mortality rates from
infectious diseases can be considered one of the most significant public health suc-
cess stories. As discussed in (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (g), 2011)
vaccination of each US birth cohort prevents “42,000 deaths and 20 million cases of
disease”.
Vaccination is one of the few cost-effective medical measures that result in popu-
lation level broad benefit across the multiple dimensions of the population spectrum.
Despite this, there is evidence in Western Europe, the United States, Japan, Aus-
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tralia, and other countries of a growing anti-vaccine movement. The media plays a
big role in the dissemination and sensationalization of vaccine objections, which is
known as the “anti-vaccine movement” and has had a demonstrable impact on vac-
cination policies and individual and community health. In addition, our society is
poorly educated on practical applications of risk and probability thus lacking the ex-
pertise and understanding that our individual choices can cause significant hardship
to the broader public (Poland and Jacobson, 2001).
Since the publication in 1998, of the now retracted paper by (Wakefield et al.,
1998), that connected a number of disorders, including potential increased occurrence
of autism, to Measles, Mumps, and Rubella (MMR) vaccine, there emerged an active
anti-vaccine movement in the United States and the United Kingdom (Chen and
DeStefano, 1998). At the current time, there are well over four hundred thousand
anti-vaccine internet sites from a single simple Google search. A telephone survey
was conducted in 2000 to a nationally representative sample of 1600 US parents of
children < 6 years old (Gellin et al., 2000). The results revealed that 1 in 4 parents
believed that a child’s immune system was ’weakened’ by too many vaccines. Twenty-
three percent believed that children got more immunizations than was good for their
health, and fifteen percent did not want their next child to get at least one of the
currently recommended vaccines.
Furthermore, internet usage statistics show approximately 84.9% of Americans
are online. An estimated 75% − 80% of users search for health information online
(Fox, 2008). Over half (52%) of users believe “almost all” or “most” information
on health websites is credible (Fox and Rainie, 2000). In fact, many parents who
exempt children from vaccination are more likely to have obtained information from
the internet and more likely to have used certain anti-vaccination websites (Salmon
et al., 2005). Many would argue that we have become an information society where
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information, accurate or inaccurate, is widely available, utilized, and promulgated
across the world via the internet. This plays into widespread feelings on the part of
many Americans who now view their government with various levels of mistrust (some
legitimate, some not) further fueling concerns over ’governmental’ recommendations
regarding vaccine use, and governmental assurances regarding vaccine safety (Poland
and Jacobson, 2001).
Unfortunately, parents who seek to delay or avoid routine vaccinations for their
children put their own children at risk and their actions contribute to herd immu-
nity failure even among highly vaccinated populations (Jacobson et al., 2007). This
movement has likely led to increase in cases of highly preventable diseases, including
record cases of measles in 2014 as reported by the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention. As of September 29, 2014, there have been 594 cases of measles, includ-
ing 18 outbreaks accounting for 89% of reported cases that year (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (f), 2014). Since 2001, this was the largest number of cases
by almost a factor of 3 as compared to any other year. The majority of the cases
have occurred in unvaccinated individuals.
The anti-vaccine movement has seen significant support from celebrities, who have
a disproportionate access to a public platform (as compared to an average individual
or parent). Recently, the news sources such as the New York Times have written
extensively on the topic, predominantly critically. A few examples are included in
(Shih, 2014; Norton, 2014; Chen, 2014).
While the anti-vaccine movement has been studied in the medical and social sci-
ence community (Poland and Jacobson, 2001; Kata, 2010) and in context of the logical
flaws in arguments against vaccines (Jacobson et al., 2007), there has not been pre-
vious work done on the anti-vaccine movement as a social contagion. On the other
hand, epidemiological models have been applied to spread of other ideas (Feynman
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diagrams) as in (Bettencourt et al., 2006) giving indication that the approach would
be potentially applicable in this case.
Of particular interest in this context is that the spread of the social construct
leads to literal epidemics, potentially elucidating the interactions between social and
disease mechanisms. In this analysis, the anti-vaccine movement is treated as a con-
tagious disease. Specifically, the interest lies in identifying recovery rates and trans-
mission rates. This type of information could be beneficial to public health officials
in understanding the nature of the anti-vaccine movement, potentially allowing for
optimization and targeting of information campaigns.
Here, the analysis of vaccination trends in California, United States and the fit
of a compartmental model to the vaccination data is presented. Leveraging birth
rate information, the goal is to study whether spread of the anti-vaccine movement
can be detected and modeled in vaccination rates for MMR: Measles, Mumps, and
Rubella vaccine over the course of 19 years starting in 1995. The State of California
was chosen as the focus of the analysis due to significant measles activity in the state
as indicated in (California Department of Public Health, 2014). Preliminary analysis
indicates that there doesn’t appear to be an epidemic-like behavior in the data. One
possibility to explain this outcome is that we are at the peak of the anti-vaccine
“epidemic” and the current record number of cases of measles in 2014 will serve as a
negative feedback mechanism for the trend.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Data
As discussed above, while the model is for a social process, it will leverage mea-
surable outcomes of the social process. Specifically, by using the data on vaccination
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rates and birth rates. The incidence of new cases, will be estimated by multiplying
the (1-vaccination rate) by the birth rate. For this analysis, it was also decided to
focus specifically on the state of California, as the California data on birthrates is
more extensive (covering more years) than national US birthrate data. Additionally,
since there has been population growth but effectively constant number of births,
population data was also included in the analysis in order to fit birth and death
rates.
Specific data sources are described below.
Immunization Rates
www.cdc.gov/vaccines/imz-managers/coverage/imz-coverage.html: This website pro-
vides immunization rates for Children, Teens, and Adults for the United States as a
whole and by state (and by vaccine type). This study will focus on the “Children
Only” data. The data is available by year from 2013 back to 1995. An example
data table from 2013 is found by navigating from the website above to “Children
Only” to “Tables” on the 2013 line to the pdf of the table. In California, in 2013, the
vaccination rate is 90.7 ± 5.3 (as can be read from the table). This study will focus
its analysis on the vaccination rate. This will serve as the incidence data to fit the
model (from this data, specifically, MMR vaccination rate, and the birth rate, will
serve to estimate the number of unvaccinated children). As the data is provided by
state, California data will be used.
Births Data
This website has California birth rates going back to 1960.
www.cdph.ca.gov/data/statistics/Pages/StatewideBirthStatisticalDataTables.aspx
This particular table:
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www.cdph.ca.gov/data/statistics/Documents/VSC-2011-0201.pdf
provides birthrates from 2011 to 1960. For example, in 2011, there were 509,979 live
births in CA.
The model will be set to 1994-2013 time interval, estimating births in 2012 and
2013 based on birthrate scaling from 1960-2011. The time interval of 1 year will be
used with potential interpolation of 6 months to create more data points.
The time series of the vaccination data is presented in Figure 3.2. Birth rates
for 2012 and 2013 were estimated by computing averages of previous years’ birthrate
data. The count data was derived by multiplying vaccination rates by the birthrate.
In the model fitting methodology as described later, the S and I compartments are
treated separately from the KS and the KI compartments.
Population Data
www.calrecycle.ca.gov/lgcentral/goalmeasure/disposalrate/Graphs/PopEmploy.html
This website provides California time series data. In addition to the population data,
to fit fractions of the population that are children the time series data in the following
link that provides information on number of children under the age of 18 was used:
www.kidsdata.org/topic/32/childpopulation/table#fmt=139&tf=79&sort
ColumnId=0&sortType=asc.
3.2.2 Model
Population model
To model the vital dynamics of the population a compartmental population model
with two age groups, kids (K) and adults (A), and birth rate µ, where kids are defined
to be 18 years and younger was used. As shown in Figure 3.1, the number of births in
California has remained approximately constant for several years, but the population
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Figure 3.1: Time Series of the Population Data Including Children and Adult Pop-
ulations in a given Year.
size is growing. This indicates that the birth rate of the adults must be falling in
time. This effect was then approximated using a linear formulation of the birth rate,
µ = µ0 + µ1t, where t is the time, in years, relative to January 1, 1995.
The equations for the model are:
dK/dt = (µ0 + µ1t)A− ωK
dA/dt = ωK − δA, (3.1)
where ω is the rate at which children mature to the adult compartment, and δ is the
net rate at which individuals leave the adult compartment, through the processes of
30
5 10 15
0e
+0
0
1e
+0
5
2e
+0
5
3e
+0
5
4e
+0
5
5e
+0
5
6e
+0
5
Vaccination trends in California
Year relative to 1995
N
um
be
r o
f p
eo
pl
e
Ks, vaccinated
Ki, unvaccinated
Ki+Ks, as an approximation for I+S
Figure 3.2: Time Series of the Data Including Population of Vaccinated and Unvac-
cinated Children in a given Year.
emigration/immigration or death. The death rate of children was ignored. The total
population size is N = K + A.
The parameters of this model (µ0, µ1, ω, and δ) are fit to the time series of
California population data for kids and adults.
Anti-vaccine contagion model
To model the social contagion of anti-vaccination ideology, a four compartment conta-
gion model was employed, with adults divided into vaccinators and anti-vaccinators.
Vaccinators were considered to be susceptible to be infected with the ideology of the
anti-vaccination movement. These two types of adults will be refere as AS and AI ,
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for the vaccinators and anti-vaccinators, respectively. Children of these two groups
are KS and KI , respectively.
The model equations are:
dKS
dt
= (µ0 + µ1t)AS − ωKS
dKI
dt
= (µ0 + µ1t)AI − ωKI
dAS
dt
= ωKS − βASAI/(AS +AI)− δAS + γAI
dAI
dt
= ωKI + βASAI/(AS +AI)− δAI − γAI , (3.2)
where β is the transmission rate of anti-vaccination ideology from the AI class to
the AS class, and γ is the rate at which anti-vaccinators “recover” from their ideology
and become vaccinators. All other parameters related to the population dynamics
are as described in the previous section.
The model parameters β and γ are fit to the time series of data on the number of
vaccinated and unvaccinated children in California. The initial fractions of vaccinated
kids, fKS , and adults who vaccinate, fAS , at time t = 0 is also estimated.
3.2.3 Estimation of Model Parameters
To estimate the parameters of the population and contagion model that optimally
describe the associated data samples, the parameters of the models were randomly
sampled from broad uniform distributions, and calculate the Pearson χ2 goodness-
of-fit statistic comparing the model to the data sample. The uniform distribution
sampling range is chosen to be large enough to ultimately include the parameter
optimal value and at least a ±5 standard deviation range about that value. This
procedure is repeated one million times for each sample with the use of NSF XSEDE
high-throughput computing resources in order to determine the parameter hypotheses
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Figure 3.3: KSI Model where the Flow γ from Ai to As is Zero.
that minimize the Pearson χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic. To determine the parameter
95% confidence intervals, the Pearson χ2 statistic is corrected for over-dispersion using
(McCullagh et al., 1973).
3.3 Results
The parameter fitting procedure was performed in two tiers. The parameter hy-
potheses for the population parameters (µ0, µ1, ω, δ) in the 95% confidence interval
are presented in Figure 3.4. The parameter hypotheses for the anti-vaccine and ini-
tial condition parameters (β, fKs, fS) in the 95% confidence interval are presented in
Figure 3.5. The best fit parameters values along with the 95% confidence interval
for each fitted parameter are in Table 3.1
3.4 Discussion
In this analysis, a compartmental model of the anti-vaccine movement was devel-
oped. To account for the variability in birth rates over the temporal window under
consideration, 7 parameters were fitted. The recovery parameter (γ) was identified
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Table 3.1: KSI Model Best Fit Parameters.
Parameter Value 95% Confidence Interval
µ0 0.0235 [0.0216, 0.0250]
µ1 -0.0003 [-0.0005, -0.0002]
δ 0.0104 [0.0070, 0.0130]
ω 0.0821 [0.0668, 0.0964]
β 0.1295 [0.0404, 0.1609]
γ 0 not fitted
fKs 0.9958 [0.5599, 1]
fS 0.9098 [0.8870, 0.9310]
Dispersion-corrected Pearson chi-squared
0.0215 0.0220 0.0225 0.0230 0.0235 0.0240 0.0245 0.0250
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Figure 3.4: Population Parameters and Overlay of Best Fit Model (Log Scale) on
the Data.
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Figure 3.5: Anti-vaccine Parameters and Overlay of Best Fit Model (Log Scale) on
the Data.
to be 0 in early experiments and as illustrated in Figure 3.5. This, in itself, is an
interesting outcome of the analysis, as it appears that once an individual is infected
with the anti-vaccine philosophy, there is no recovery. Therefore, it is likely valuable
to focus the public health and vaccine information campaigns on susceptible pop-
ulations (as opposed to infected) to minimize the number of individuals that move
between those classes.
Almost all of the parameters fitted (µ0, µ1, δ, ω, β, fS) had very narrow ranges in
the 95% confidence interval, indicating a rather good fit to the existing data. Fitting
of fKs (the initial fraction of children vaccinated), on the other hand, did not produce
a close fit. The best fit model, however, is produced with the parameter hypothesis
of almost 1 (100% of children are initially vaccinated). This is consistent with the
fact that much of the anti-vaccination trend has been attributed to the retracted
Wakefield paper which was published in 1998.
Generally, the data and the resulting model do not have the shape of an epidemic,
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and yet, the occurrence of measles has been rising. This is potentially due to such
phenomena as herd immunity, where just a small fraction of anti-vaccinators (which
could remain constant) lead to outbreaks of the disease. One other hypothesis that
may explain this data is that we have reached the peak of the anti-vaccine epidemic
and the trend is now beginning to reverse. The reversal of the trend is not at the
moment observed in the data, but may be apparent with analysis covering more recent
years (once the data becomes available).
As potential future work, a vector model of infection where the vector could be
the prevalence of celebrity advocacy for the anti-vaccine movement or anti-vaccine
websites may be considered. At writing, it is not clear that data sets that would
support such analysis exist.
3.5 Conclusion
In order to provide insight into the anti-vaccine social movement, parameters for
a compartmentalized model were defined and fitted. In this research, the social con-
tagion was modeled leveraging measurable outcomes (specifically, vaccination rates).
This is the first analysis of its kind and the best fit model is indeed a good fit to
the data. This analysis can be used to inform public health officials on the dynamics
of the anti-vaccine movement and allow optimization of resources. In future work,
it may be worthwhile to consider other factors - such as celebrity advocacy for the
anti-vaccine movement and the fear inflicted by websites or social media using a
vector-based approach.
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Chapter 4
THE ROLE OF SHORT-TERM DISPERSAL AND SOCIAL INSECURITY ON
THE TRANSMISSION DYNAMICS OF ZIKA VIRUS IN AN EXTREME
IDEALIZED ENVIRONMENT: THE CASE OF ZIKA VIRUS IN EL SALVADOR.
Background During the last months of 2015, Zika virus (ZIKV) reached El Salvador.
The first case of Zika virus infection was reported in November 2015, an event followed
by an explosive outbreak that generated over 6000 suspected cases by January 2016.
National agencies promptly began the implementation of known control measures like
vector control and recommending the use of repellents. Further, in response to the
alarming and growing number of microcephaly cases in Brazil, the importance of safe
sex and avoiding pregnancies for a period of two years was stressed.
Methods The goal of this study is to explore the role of short-term mobility within
communities characterized by extreme poverty, crime, and violence. Specifically, the
role of short-term mobility between two idealized interconnected, highly distinct com-
munities is explored in the context of ZIKV outbreaks, in which mobility patterns are
affected by social factors inherent to each community. In order to highlight the possi-
ble effects that short-term mobility might have on the dynamics of a ZIKV outbreak,
a Lagrangian modeling approach within a two-patch setting within highly distinct en-
vironments is used. Moreover, the overall goal is to understand how mobility might
reduce the overall number of cases, not just in the most affluent areas but every-
where. Outcomes depend on existing mobility patterns, levels of disease risk, and the
ability of federal or state public health services to invest and effectively implement in
resource limited areas, particularly in those where violence is systemic.
Results The results, via simulations, of highly polarized and simplified scenarios
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are used to assess the role of mobility. Observing the results, it was evident that
matching observed patterns of ZIKV outbreaks could not be captured without in-
corporating increasing levels of heterogeneity, particularly those associated with the
vector populations.
Conclusions As a result, short-term mobility along with elevated violence rates,
that somehow have a negative impact on the ability for health crews to establish
effective vector control measures (in certain communities), leads to the existence of
disease sources (under certain mobility patterns) and to the literal waste of resources
allocated to vector control efforts, if these are not implemented in the entire region in
a reasonable way. Without loss of generality, similar results during a Dengue fever and
Chikungunya outbreak are expected. Moreover, the number of highly heterogeneous
environments (patches), as well as, the variations on patch connectivity structure
required to match ZIKV patterns could not be met within the highly aggregated
two-patch model used in the simulations.
4.1 Introduction
Zika virus (ZIKV), an emerging vector-borne disease closely related to yellow fever,
dengue and West Nile (Hayes et al., 2009), has taken the Americas by storm. ZIKV is
a flavivirus, transmitted primarily by female Aedes aegypti mosquitoes, which is also
a competent vector in the transmission of dengue and chikungunya. According to the
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (n), 2016), as of February 9, 2016, ZIKV
cases had been reported throughout the Caribbean, Mexico and South America with
the exception of Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay and Peru. As of September
23, 2016, only Canada, Chile and Uruguay haven’t confirmed autochthonous, vector-
borne transmission of Zika virus disease (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(i), 2016; Pan American Health Organization, 2017). In fact, several states within
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the United States had also reported ZIKV cases(Petersen, 2016) and while ZIKV was
expected to be managed effectively within the USA, the possibility of localized ZIKV
outbreaks couldn’t be ruled out since there were many areas in which capable vectors
were endemic.
While phylogenetic analyses have revealed the existence of two main virus lin-
eages (African and Asian) (Faye et al., 2014; Haddow et al., 2012), no concise clinical
differences have been identified between infections with different strains. Nonethe-
less, it is important to note that most African samples come from a rhesus sentinel
in Uganda during primate and mosquito surveillance efforts aimed at assessing Yel-
low Fever trends in 1947, when ZIKV was first discovered (Dick et al., 1952). It is
believed that the African lineage has circulated primarily in wild primates and ar-
boreal mosquitoes, such as Aedes africanus, within a narrow equatorial belt running
across Africa and into Asia. Spillover events to humans have rarely occurred, or not
recorded, even in areas found to be highly enzootic (Fauci and Morens, 2016; Musso
et al., 2015). The Asian lineage, seems to have originated from the adaptation of the
virus as it successfully invaded a different vector, Aedes aegypti, a vector capable of
infecting human populations rather effectively due to its adaptability to urban and
semi-urban environments, (Fauci and Morens, 2016; Haddow et al., 2012).
While ZIKV was first found in 1947, the first human infection was reported in
Nigeria in 1954 (Macnamara, 1954). It is believed that the first time ZIKV moved
out of Africa and Asia was during the 2007 outbreak in Yap Island in the Federated
States of Micronesia (Duffy et al., 2009); followed by an even larger outbreak in
French Polynesia in 2013-2014 (Cao-Lormeau and Musso, 2014); then reaching New
Caledonia, the Cook Islands and Eastern Islands (Musso et al., 2014). Decades old
data, from African researchers, support the possibility that ZIKV spread might have
been facilitated by prior chikungunya outbreaks (Fauci and Morens, 2016). A pattern
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seen once again in 2013 when chikungunya spread from west to east and then followed
by ZIKV outbreaks (Fauci and Morens, 2016).
In early 2015, ZIKV was detected in Brazil and phylogenetic analyses placed the
Brazilian strains within the Asian lineage (Zanluca et al., 2015); the same strain de-
tected during the 2013-2014 French Polynesian outbreak (Cao-Lormeau et al., 2014).
Since the first detection of ZIKV in Brazil, we have seen an explosive outbreak quickly
reached Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guyana, Guyana, Paraguay, Suri-
name, and Venezuela (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (l), 2016). Fur-
thermore, within few months from the first case in Brazil, several Central America
countries have been invaded by ZIKV, including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (m),
2016). As of September 23, 2016, all of the nations in the Americas have experience
active ZIKV outbreaks with the exception of Canada, Chile, and Uruguay(Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (i), 2016; Pan American Health Organization, 2017).
This rapid geographic expansion of ZIKV led the World Health Organization (WHO)
to declare it an international public health emergency (World Health Organization
(b), 2016).
It has been estimated that about 4 out of 5 ZIKV infections are asymptomatic
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (i), 2016; Duffy et al., 2009), some-
thing common among vector born diseases spread by Aedes aegypti mosquitoes.
ZIKV clinical manifestations include, arthralgia, particularly swelling, mild fever,
lymphadenopathy, skin rash, headaches, retro orbital pain, and conjunctivitis, which
normally last for 2-7 days (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (i), 2016;
World Health Organization (b), 2016; Zanluca et al., 2015). It is important to note
that many of these symptoms are also associated with Dengue infections. These sim-
ilarities, could cause high levels of uncertainty in the efforts to asses the total number
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of patients infected with ZIKV. As a result of these sources of mis-identification, it
is believed that the total ZIKV burden may be higher than what it has been re-
ported (Fauci and Morens, 2016; Salvador and Fujita, 2015). Moreover, co-infection
with other diseases like dengue are not uncommon and as a result ZIKV diagno-
sis is difficult (Dupont-Rouzeyrol et al., 2015). Nonetheless, scientists from Arizona
State University and Harvard University have created a diagnostic tool, similar to
a pregnancy test, capable of given a quick, effective, simple and inexpensive way of
diagnosing ZIKV infections (Harvard Gazette, 2016; The Biodesign Institute, 2016),
and a powerful tool that could be used to prevent the uncontrolled spread of ZIKV
countries with limited resources.
Since, ZIKV infections have been linked with neurological (microcephaly) and
auto-immune (Guillain-Barre´ syndrome) complications, the lack of an approved vac-
cine is a concern. In addition, evidence supports sexual transmission, a new transmis-
sion pathway for a vector born disease (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(k), 2016; World Health Organization (b), 2016). Preventive education on ZIKV
transmission modes are essential in order to halt its spread at the regional, national
and global levels. Basic control measures are limited to vector control, including the
use of insect repellents, the use of protection while engaged in sexual activity and sex
abstinence (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (k), 2016).
Furthermore, resource limited and poor nations face additional challenges that
make the use of standard efforts and approaches aimed at controlling vector borne
diseases ineffective. These challenges are often driven by social factors that cause
extreme variations in the levels of public safety, gang violence and conflict. Ignoring
these factors affecting the weakest communities, promotes the global spread of dis-
eases and poses a serious threat to global health [see (Patterson-Lomba et al., 2016;
Espinoza et al., 2016; Perrings et al., 2014; Castillo-Chavez et al., 2015; Patterson-
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Lomba et al., 2015; Zhao et al., 2014; Chowell et al., 2015)]. The importance of
focusing on the weakest links of global transmission networks becomes obvious when
analyzing the levels of violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, housing 9%
of the global population but accounting for 33% of the world’s homicides (Jaitman,
2015). In this study, the impact associated with restrictions to public safety, which
affect mobility and subsequently the local risk of infection, might have on the dynam-
ics of ZIKV transmission and control are analyzed. The long-term goal is to limit the
role violence and conflict play on the overall health patterns of individuals living in
the Caribbean, particularly in El Salvador.
4.2 Single Patch Model
A simplified vector-borne transmission model is used as a building block for the
derivation of highly simplified two-patch scenarios. A two-patch models is then used
to explore the role of residence times and risk of infection (possibly defined by under-
lying levels of violence or a lack of a health-medical infrastructure or a combination
of both) on the dynamics of ZIKV. The general version of an n-patch framework and
its analysis can be found in (Bichara and Castillo-Chavez, 2016) and similar studies
can be found in (Espinoza et al., 2016; Moreno et al., 2017a).
Patch heterogeneity is incorporated by the assumption that, while the first patch
experiences low levels of security, making it difficult to carry out sustainable vector
control efforts, the second patch is considered to be safe with access to reasonable
health services on demand. In other words, a highly bi-modal situation, an idealized
situation, that does not capture the levels of complexity and heterogeneity experienced
in conflict or crime ridden communities.
Hence, the simulations are based on highly idealized exploratory settings that
might lead to realistic conclusions when these models are parameterized using “re-
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alistic” parameter estimates. While highly detailed models require huge amounts of
data including information that needs to be collected or measured within accepted
protocols, the proper parametrization of these detailed models may require detailed
accounts of the individuals involved. An example is the work done by the EpiSims
project (Stroud et al., 2007) that used individuals’ daily mobility activities to model
spread of disease in the city of Seattle. The kind of worthwhile and far reaching
project this paper aims to motivate in the context of the interconnection of commu-
nities where violence and health disparities are the norm.
In this study, it is assumed that there are two patches with contrasting risks of
infection (high and low risk). Each patch is made up of individuals experiencing the
same degree of risk of infection throughout the patch, risk is an inherent function of
the patch. Consequently, all individuals while in Patch 1 will be experiencing high
risk of infection, while those in Patch 2 will be experiencing low risk. In short, the
movement of individuals as a consequence of daily activities could alter the proportion
of the time each individual spends on a given patch. The longer an individual stays
in Patch 1, the more likely it is to become infected. The level of patch-specific risk
to infection in this study is captured by the parameter βˆi, i = 1, 2. More specifically,
βˆ1  βˆ2. This assumption models, in a rather simplistic way, the health disparities
that could be addressed within highly polarized settings. In short, this is a first effort
aimed at exploring the role of risk and mobility on the dynamics of ZIKV in a world
where two highly-distinct mobile communities co-exist. The case of Johannesburg
and Soweto in South Africa, or North and South Bogota in Colombia, or Rio de
Janeiro and adjacent favelas in Brazil, or gang-controlled and gang-free areas within
San Salvador, are but some of the unfortunately large number of pockets dominated
by conflict or high crime within urban centers around world. The short time scale
dynamics of individuals (daily mobility as they go to work or carry out on other
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activities including attendance to schools and universities) in both patches are incor-
porated within this model with the analysis (numerical simulations) carried out over
the duration of a single outbreak.
4.2.1 The Aedes Aegypti Mosquito Feeding Habits
ZIKV transmission is the result of a bite from an infected female mosquito of the
genus Aedes (subgenus Stegomyia) (Engelthaler et al., 1997; WHO (a), 2017). The
most predominant and at the same time the most effective ZIKV vector is Aedes
aegypti. However, the Asian tiger mosquito, Aedes albopictus, is also able to transmit
ZIKV (WHO (a), 2017). In addition, their ability to breed in small amounts of
still water, as small as a bottle cap, and egg resistance to long periods of drought
(as long as one year) makes them ideal for an environment with excess trash and
decaying infrastructure, usually found around large urban centers. Consequently,
unplanned rapid urbanization or poorly planned urbanization has the potential to
provide abundant nesting grounds for mosquitoes and when combined with rapid
human population growth, it increases the average number of encounters between
humans and mosquitoes. Not to mention that in some regions, abiotic factors support
the Aedes aegypti breeding cycle throughout the entire year.
While female Aedes aegypti mosquitoes consume plant carbohydrates for energy
and maintenance reserves, blood meals are required in order to provide enough nutri-
ents to complete the vitellogenesis process during each gonotrophic cycle (Scott and
Takken, 2012). Female Aedes aegypti mosquitoes are diurnal and usually prefer to
have multiple blood meals during every gonotrophic cycle. In addition, Aedes aegypti
exhibits a preference for human blood and will not feed on sugar when human blood
meals are available. Studies show that in some cases over 90% of the blood meals
come from humans (Scott and Takken, 2012). A behavior that seems to improve the
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nutritional aspects of survival and it is even suggested as an adaptation to optimize
fitness (Scott and Takken, 2012). Furthermore, Aedes aegypti are considered efficient
vectors since they are easily disturbed while feeding leading to multiple bites from
multiple hosts to complete one blood meal (Jansen and Beebe, 2010). Meaning that
entire families could get infected by a single mosquito in a period of 2 days. More-
over, their preference for human hosts has led DENV (another disease transmitted
by this mosquito) to no longer require a sylvatic cycle and easily achieve endemicity
in these environments. Mosquitoes are capable of transmitting the virus from one
person to the next if it bites a susceptible individual immediately after biting and
acquiring the virus from an infected individual (or within one day before the onset of
symptoms). Otherwise, it takes between 4 to 15 days for the virus to replicate in the
mosquito’s salivary glands and become infectious for the rest of its life (Towers et al.,
2016). ZIKV infection doesn’t have an adverse impact on mosquitoes. On average,
Aedes aegypti mosquitoes live for 21 days but their life span ranges from two to three
weeks in the wild and up to 65 days in a laboratory setting. In addition, while it is
known that ZIKV could be transmitted vertically in mosquitoes (Ciota et al., 2017)
and humans, in this study the focus will be on direct transmission. Finally, since
mosquitoes are restricted to a short range of travel, ZIKV spread depends mostly on
human mobility patterns. Meaning that, highly mobile populations living in regions
undergoing active ZIKV outbreaks are highly likely to be the main drivers of ZIKV
spread.
4.2.2 Force of Infection and Model
One of the most important factors of the vector borne model is to determine an
appropriate force of infection for both hosts and vectors. In particular, it is important
to have a sense of the process and how both host and vectors get infected. It is
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clear that female vectors require of a blood meal in order to lay eggs and reproduce.
Then, the force of infection is determined by the product of: average number of
meals a mosquito has during a day; the average proportion of meals that comes
from a human host; the average number of bites it requires to complete a meal; the
proportion of female mosquitoes to hosts; the probability of infection per bite; the
number of susceptibles; and the proportion of infected mosquitoes (see Table 4.1 for
parameter values).
Table 4.1: Force of Infection Parameters
Symbol Description Value Units Reference
m Blood meals 0.76 meal
day∗mosquito (Scott and Takken, 2012)
ρ Prop. human meals 0.9 human (Scott and Takken, 2012)
α Bites 1− 5 bites
meal
(Scott and Takken, 2012)
fv Prop. Female vectors 0.5 – –
βhv Prob. of Infection [0, 1]
1
bite
–
Notice that in this model b = mραfv ranging from 0.34 to 1.71, similar to the
range used in (Maxian et al., 2017). It is worth to mention that a study conducted
on the susceptibility of Italian Aedes aegypti suggests that the probability of infection
from an infected meal to mosquitoes is βhv = 26% (Di Luca et al., 2016).
As a result, the ZIKV dynamics single patch model involves hosts and vectors
populations of size Nh and Nv, respectively. Both populations are then subdivided
into sub-populations defined by ZIKV epidemiological states. The transmission pro-
cess is then modeled as the result of the interactions of these sub-populations. On
that account, the host population is subdivided into susceptible Sh, latent Eh, infec-
tious asymptomatic Ih,a, infectious symptomatic Ih,s and recovered Rh individuals.
Similarly, Sv, Ev and Iv denote the susceptible, latent and infectious mosquito sub-
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populations, respectively. Since the focus is on the study of disease dynamics over
a single outbreak, hosts’ demographics are neglected, while it is assumed that the
vector’s demographics do not change, meaning that, the per capita birth and death
mosquito rates are the same. Since recent reports (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (i), 2016; Duffy et al., 2009) suggest the presence of large numbers of
asymptomatic ZIKV infectious individuals, two classes of infectious Ih,a and Ih,s, that
is, asymptomatic and symptomatic infectious individuals will be considered. More-
over, due to the lack of knowledge regarding the dynamics of ZIKV transmission, it
is assumed that Ih,a and Ih,s individuals are equally infectious. These assumptions
support the reduction of the model to a single infectious class Ih = Ih,a+Ih,s, nonethe-
less, both infectious classes will be used as it may be desirable to keep track of both
types and the overall burden of ZIKV. These assumptions might not be too bad given
the current knowledge of ZIKV epidemiology and the fact that ZIKV infections, in
general, are not severe. Meaning, that voluntary self-reporting are expected to be
low. Furthermore, given that the infectious process of ZIKV is somewhat similar
to that of dengue, parameters estimated in dengue transmission studies within El
Salvador were used through out this study. In addition, ZIKV basic reproduction
number estimates are taken from outbreak data collected in Barranquilla Colombia
(Towers et al., 2016). Furthermore, selected parameters ranges used in this study
benefited from prior estimates using data from the 2013-2014 French Polynesia out-
break (Kucharski et al., 2016), some of the best available at the time. The dynamics
of the prototypic single patch system, single outbreak, can be modeled using the fol-
lowing standard nonlinear system of eight differential equations representing each of
the epidemiological stages of ZIKV (Brauer et al., 2012):
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
S˙h = −bβvhSh IvNh
E˙h = bβvhSh
Iv
Nh
− νhEh
I˙h,s = (1− q)νhEh − γhIh,s
I˙h,a = qνhEh − γhIh,a
R˙h = γh(Ih,s + Ih,a)
S˙v = µvNv − bβhvSv Ih,s+Ih,aNh − µvSv
E˙v = bβhvSv
Ih,s+Ih,a
Nh
− (µv + νv)Ev
I˙v = νvEv − µvIv
(4.1)
The parameters of Model 4.1 are collected and described in Table 4.2, while the
model flow diagram is presented in Fig 4.1.
Table 4.2: Description of the Parameters Used in System (4.1).
Parameter Description Value
βvh Infectiousness of human to mosquitoes 0.26
βhv Infectiousness of mosquitoes to humans 0.5
bi Biting rate in Patch i 0.8
νh Humans’ incubation rate
1
7
q Fraction of latent becoming asymptomatic and infectious 0.1218
γi Recovery rate in Patch i
1
5
pij Proportion of time residents of Patch i spend in Patch j [0, 1]
µv Vectors’ natural mortality rate
1
13
νv Vectors’ incubation rate
1
9.5
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Rh
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qνh (1− q)νh
γh γh
bβhv
Ih,a+Ih,s
Nh νvµv
µv µv µv
Figure 4.1: Flow Diagram of Model (4.1)
The basic reproduction number for this prototypic model, that is, the average
number of secondary infections generated by a typical infectious individual in a com-
pletely susceptible population or where nobody has experienced a ZIKV-infection is
computed by taking S(0) = Nh in Model (4.1). The basic reproduction number is
given by
R20 =
b2Nvβvhβhvνv[(1− q)γh + qγh]
Nhγ2hµv(µv + νv)
:= R20,s +R20,a. (4.2)
R0 =
√
Nvb2βvhβhvνv
Nhγhµv(νv + µv).
Notice that the reduced form corresponds to the basic reproduction number when the
two classes of infective are combined, that is, Ih = Ih,a + Ih,s.
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The dynamics of the single patch model are well known. In short, an R0 < 1
indicates that an epidemic is unable to develop and the proportion of introduced
infected individuals decrease, while an R0 > 1 indicates that the infected host popu-
lation grows, and an outbreak takes place since the number of cases from the second
generation exceeds the initial size of the introduced infected population at time t = 0.
Finally, when R0 > 1, the population of infected individuals eventually decreases and
the disease dies out since it is only modeling a single outbreak.
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
Biting Rate/Vector-Host Ratio
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
R
0
Vector-Host Ratio
Biting Rate
Figure 4.2: Basic Reproductive Number as a Function of the Vector-Host Ratio;
Biting Rate.
4.3 Basic Reproductive Number Sensitivity Analysis
Partial rank correlation coefficients (PRCCs) for the aggregate R0 and each of
the input parameters were produced from a single replication with 1,000,000 runs
to graphically evaluate the monotonicity between a given input parameter and the
aggregate R0 using the distributions from Table 4.3 (see figures 4.3 and 4.4). The
corresponding value of these PRCCs corresponds to the level of statistical influence
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the associated input parameter has on the variability of the aggregate R0 due to its
own estimation uncertainty. PRCCs are statistically significant when |PRCC| > 0.5.
The larger the magnitude of the PRCC, the more significant the parameter is in
generating uncertainty or variability in R0. The sign of the PRCC indicates whether
an increase in a parameter will lead to a higher R0 or lower R0.
Table 4.3: Parameters Used for the Sensitivity Analysis of Formula (4.2).
Parameter Description Distribution
βvh Infectiousness of human to vectors U(0, 1)
βhv Infectiousness of vector to humans U(0, 1)
bi Biting rate in Patch i U(0, 2.5)
γi Recovery rate in Patch i U(3, 7)
Nhi Humans in Patch i U(103, 104)
Nvi Vectors in Patch i U(104, 105)
µv Vectors’ natural mortality rate U(6, 21)
νv Vectors’ incubation rate U(4, 15)
Clearly, uncertainty or variability in b; βvh; βhv; and Nv positively influence the
magnitude of the R0 and consequently the infectious class, while Nh influences the
magnitude of theR0 negatively (see Figure 4.3). As expected, variability in the biting
rate has the highest impact on the R0 (see Figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.3: Partial Rank Correlation Coefficients For The Basic Reproductive Num-
ber and Each Input Parameter Variables.
Similarly, uncertainty or variability in b; βvh; βhv; and Λ positively influence the
magnitude of the R0 and consequently the infectious class when Λ = NvNh . Once again,
variability in the biting rate has the highest impact on the R0, but notice that in this
case there are no parameters that would influence the magnitude of the R0 negatively
(see Figure 4.4).
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.
Consequently, using a Latin Hypercube sampling design and applying sensitivity
analysis techniques, the variability ofR0 and thus the transmission dynamics of ZIKV
depicted in Model (4.1) were explored. Applying these techniques made it possible
to evaluate the sensitivity of the R0 estimate with respect to each of the parameter
values from Table 4.3 and to determine which parameters have the greatest influence
on the variability ofR0. In particular, those that would create the worst case scenarios
during a ZIKV outbreak.
In the next section, a two patch model using the Lagrangian approach specified
in (Bichara and Castillo-Chavez, 2016; Bichara et al., 2015) is introduced with indi-
viduals from Patch i (i = 1, 2) maintaining their residency status regardless of the
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proportion of time they spend in other patches as a result of their daily mobility pat-
terns across distinct interconnected patches; an assumption captured with the use of a
residence time matrix (P). A matrix, where each entry pij models the average (in this
study, fixed) proportion of time, a typical resident spends on his/her own patch or as
a visitor to another patch per unit of time (pi1 + pi2 = 1). Hence, at any given time
t, the effective population size in each patch accounts for both; patch residents and
patch visitors. Moreover, the effective population size does not necessarily matches
that given by the total number of patch residents. Simulations are then conducted
using parameters specific to El Salvador, as well as the most recent estimates of R0
for ZIKV in an attempt to explore the consequences of mobility (described by the
matrix P) and the impact that the differences in risk (captured on the assumption
βˆ1  βˆ2) have on the transmission dynamics of ZIKV.
4.4 Residence Times and Two-Patch Models
The role of mobility between two communities, within the same city, living under
dramatically distinct health, economic, social, and security settings is explored using
a model as simple as possible, that is, a model that only considers two patches [prior
modeling efforts that didn’t account for the effective population size but that incor-
porated specific controls include, Lee and Castillo-Chavez (2015)]. It is assumed that
Patch 2 has access to working health facilities, crime rate is low, adequate human and
financial resources and adequate public health policies in place. On the other hand,
Patch 1 lacks nearly everything and crime is high. Within this highly simplified set-
tings, the differences in risk naturally need to be incorporated. In the case of ZIKV,
risk of infection depends on host vector ratios, biting rates, the level of access and
ability to buy repellents and nets, the regularity of visits by vector control crews, and
more. These differences are captured by just postulating highly distinct transmission
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rates; that is, to study the dynamics of host mobility in highly distinct environments,
with risk being captured by one single parameter, the transmission rate, βˆ. As a
result of the previously stated assumptions, βˆ1  βˆ2 where βˆi now defines the risk of
infection in Patch i, i = 1, 2 [Patch 1 (high risk) and Patch 2 (low risk)].
As discussed in the previous sections, the host populations are stratified by epi-
demiological classes and now indexed by the patch of residency. More specifically,
Sh,i, Eh,i, Ih,a,i, Ih,s,i and Rh,i denote the susceptible, latent, infectious asymptomatic,
infectious symptomatic and recovered host populations in patch i, i = 1, 2. Similarly,
Sv,i, Ev,i and Iv,i denote the susceptible, latent and infectious mosquito populations
in patch i; i = 1, 2. As before, Nh,i and Nv,i denote the host population size and
total vector population, respectively (in patch i; i = 1, 2). In this study, the vec-
tor is assumed to be incapable of moving between patches; a reasonable assumption
in the case of Aedes aegypti, under the appropriate spatial scale. The two-patch
model-parameters are also collected in Table 4.2 with the flow diagram (Fig 4.1),
single-patch dynamics model, capturing the situation when residents and visitors do
not move; that is, when the 2× 2 residence times matrix P entries correspond to the
case in which p11 = p22 = 1.
4.4.1 Two Patch Model
The Lagrangian framework, in the context of vector born and communicable dis-
eases, is described in (Bichara and Castillo-Chavez, 2016; Bichara et al., 2016, 2015).
The application of this framework within a two patch model setting, where vectors are
incapable of moving across patches, leads to the following set of nonlinear differential
equations:
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S˙h,i = −βvhSh,i
∑2
j=1 bjpij
Iv,j
p1jNh,1+p2jNh,2
E˙h,i = βvhSh,i
∑2
j=1 bjpij
Iv,j
p1jNh,1+p2jNh,2
− νh,iEh,i
I˙h,s,i = (1− q)νh,iEh,i − γh,sIh,s,i
I˙h,a,i = qνh,iEh,i − γh,aIh,a,i
R˙h,i = γh,sIh,s,i + γh,aIh,a,i
S˙v,i = µvNv,i − biβhvSv,i
∑2
j=1 pji(Ih,s,j+Ih,a,j)∑2
k=1 pkiNh,k
− µvSv,i
E˙v,i = biβhvSv,i
∑2
j=1 pji(Ih,s,j+Ih,a,j)∑2
k=1 pkiNh,k
− (µv + νv)Ev,i
I˙v,i = νvEv,i − µvIv,i
(4.3)
where P = (pij) and pi,j represent the residence time that an individual from Patch i
spends in Patch j; i, j = 1, 2.
The basic reproduction number of this model is the largest eigenvalue of the
matrix,
M1 =
 m11 m12
m21 m22

where
m11 =
p211Nv,1Nh,1b
2
1βvhβhvνv + p
2
21Nv,1Nh,2b
2
1βvhβhvνv
(p11Nh,1 + p21Nh,2)2γhµv(νv + µv)
=
(
p211Nh,1 + p
2
21Nh,2
(p11Nh,1 + p21Nh,2)2
)(
Nv,1b
2
1βvhβhvνv
γhµv(νv + µv)
)
,
m12 =
p11p12Nv,1Nh,1b1b2βvhβhvνv + p21p22Nv,1Nh,2b1b2βvhβhvνv
(p11Nh,1 + p21Nh,2)(p12Nh,1 + p22Nh,2)γhµv(νv + µv)
=
(
p11p12Nh,1 + p21p22Nh,2
(p11Nh,1 + p21Nh,2)(p12Nh,1 + p22Nh,2)
)(
Nv,1b1b2βvhβhvνv
γhµv(νv + µv)
)
,
m21 =
p11p12Nv,2Nh,1b1b2βvhβhvνv + p21p22Nv,2Nh,2b1b2βvhβhvνv
(p11Nh,1 + p21Nh,2)(p12Nh,1 + p22Nh,2)γhµv(νv + µv)
=
(
p11p12Nh,1 + p21p22Nh,2
(p11Nh,1 + p21Nh,2)(p12Nh,1 + p22Nh,2)
)(
Nv,2b1b2βvhβhvνv
γhµv(νv + µv)
)
.
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m22 =
p212Nv,2Nh,1b
2
2βvhβhvνv + p
2
22Nv,2Nh,2b
2
2βvhβhvνv
(p12Nh,1 + p22Nh,2)2γhµv(νv + µv)
=
(
p212Nh,1 + p
2
22Nh,2
(p12Nh,1 + p22Nh,2)2
)(
Nv,2b
2
2βvhβhvνv
γhµv(νv + µv)
)
.
Specifically,
R20 =
1
2
(
m11 +m22 +
√
(m11 −m22)2 − 4m12m21
)
.
If the two patches are isolated, a case that allows us to estimate the impact ZIKV
transmission has in each patch when each community deals with ZIKV independently,
the local basic reproduction number is R0 = max{R0i}, i = 1, 2, where,
R0i =
√
Nv,ib2iβvhβhvνv
Nh,iγhµv(νv + µv)
that is, the expression found in Formula (4.2), where risk disparity in a patch is
represented by the inequality βˆ1  βˆ2, which turns out to be directly proportional
to the local basic reproduction numbers (R0i) in the absence of mobility (decoupled
patches). Changes in the entries of the coupling matrix P, would naturally have an
impact in the overall (two-patch) ZIKV dynamics. Consequently, the global basic
reproduction number, the final epidemic size, and the ZIKV levels of infection within
each patch depend on P. Results are then collected from a series of observations based
on the simulation of extreme scenarios designed to explore the role that mobility (P),
variations in the patch inherent risk (R0i), and population density have on ZIKV dy-
namic in each patch. While one can argue that the use of an extreme and simplistic
set up is unlikely to yield a broad characterization of the role of mobility, variations
in risk and host density on ZIKV outbreaks within heterogeneous populations, sim-
ulation results highlight nevertheless, the impact that mobility patterns shaped by
economic necessity for survival has on ZIKV outbreaks; or the impact of high levels
of crime and the restrictions that it imposes on vector borne control interventions
(San Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, and others) have on ZIKV outbreaks. Consequently,
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it is expected that the collaboration and sharing of health and security resources be-
tween resource-rich and resource-limited adjacent communities can make a difference
whenever there is an agreement on the trade-offs between public good and individual
safety.
4.5 Results
The use of a restricted bi-modal set-up, described in the previous section, is used
to highlight the impact of risk and mobility under a few selected, non exhaustive,
scenarios. As specified, Patch 1 experiences high levels of crime, poverty, and lack
of resources, while Patch 2 has access to vector control measures, health care facili-
ties, and resources to minimize local crime and violence; scenarios motivated by the
dynamics of disease in conflict zones and highly disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Since it is assumed that the risk of infection is associated with high levels of social
inequalities that could include high violence levels, it makes sense to assume that
since individuals experience a higher risk of ZIKV infection in Patch 1 then mobility
from Patch 2 to Patch 1 is expected to be unappealing. It is expected that typical
Patch 2 residents spend (on average) a reduced amount of time, per unit of time,
in Patch 1. Consequently, Patch 2 parameters are selected in such a way that the
dynamics of ZIKV within Patch 2 cannot be supported, in the absence of mobility
between Patch 1 and Patch 2. Thus, the local basic reproductive number for Patch
2 is less than one, namely, R02 = 0.9. In addition, mobility is modeled under the
residence times matrix P with entries given initially by, p21 = 0.10 and p12 = 0. In
particular, using the results from the sensitivity analysis the study will focus on the
case scenarios described in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4: Definitions and Scenarios for ZIKV
Nomenclature
Risk
Interpreted based on levels of prevention (biting rate)
or mosquito abundance (vector-host ratio)
High-risk patch
Defined either by low prevention that leads to high biting rate
(i.e., high b which leads to high corresponding R0) and/or
by high vector-host ratio (i.e., high Λ = Nv
Nh
)
Enhanced socio-economic
conditions
(reducing health disparity)
Defined by better health-care infrastructure which is incorporated
by high prevalence of a disease (i.e., high I(0)/N)
Mobility
Captured by average residence times of an individual
in different patches (i.e., by using P matrix)
Scenarios (assume high-risk and diminished socio-economic conditions in
Patch 1 as compared to Patch 2)
Scenario 1 b1 > b2, Λ1 = Λ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
high risk
;
I1(0)
N1
>
I2(0)
N2
;︸ ︷︷ ︸
socio-economic conditions
vary p12 when p21 ≈ 0.1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mobility
Scenario 2 b1 = b2, Λ1 > Λ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
high risk
;
I1(0)
N1
>
I2(0)
N2
;︸ ︷︷ ︸
socio-economic conditions
vary p12 when p21 ≈ 0.1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mobility
Scenario 3 b1 > b2, Λ1 > Λ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
high risk
;
I1(0)
N1
>
I2(0)
N2
;︸ ︷︷ ︸
socio-economic conditions
vary p12 when p21 ≈ 0.1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mobility
In particular, two cases are explored: (i) A “worst case” scenario where control
measures are hardly implemented due to crime, conflict or other factors on Patch 1.
As a consequence, Patch 1 is considered a place where the risk of acquiring a ZIKV
infection is high and thus it is assumed that R01 = 2. (ii) On the other hand, the
“best case” scenario corresponds to the case when Patch 1 can implement some control
measures with some degree of effectiveness and, consequently Patch 1 experiences a
reduction in the risk of infection, namely, R01 = 1.52. The patch specific basic
reproductive number (R0i) values used are in range with those previously estimated
for ZIKV outbreaks in French Polynesia (Kucharski et al., 2016) and in Colombia
(Towers et al., 2016). Simulations are seeded by introducing an asymptomatic infected
individual in Patch 1 under the assumption that both the host and vector populations
are fully susceptible in both patches.
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4.5.1 Risk Defined by Poor Bite Prevention.
Considering the “best case” scenario under the assumption that the population
in both patches is the same. Figure 4.5 shows that while some mobility values can
increase the final Patch 1 epidemic size, the maximum epidemic size only reaches
around 80% of the population when mobility is close to p12 = 0.20 . Finally, observa-
tions from the simulations suggest the existence of a mobility threshold from which
the final epidemic sizes in Patch 1 benefits.
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Figure 4.5: Scenario One: Patch Incidence and Final Size Proportions for p21 = 0.10,
p12 = 0, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.6 for Best Case.
Figure 4.6 shows the incidence and final ZIKV epidemic size under the “worst
case” scenario, defined by elevated risk and a basic reproduction number of R01 = 2.
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Figure 4.6 shows that around p12 = 0.2, the final number of infected residents in
Patch 1 is larger to the number of infections caused by the baseline scenario when
p12 = 0, but only for long outbreaks. As expected, the worst case scenario drives
ZIKV infections in almost 96% of the population in Patch 1, an unrealistic value.
Nonetheless, most p12 values show a beneficial reduction in the final Patch 1 epidemic
size.
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Figure 4.6: Scenario One: Patch Incidence and Final Size Proportions for p21 = 0.10,
p12 = 0, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.6 for Worst Case.
Figure 4.6 highlights the case when the final Patch 2 epidemic size grows as mobil-
ity from Patch 1 increases, when compared with the baseline case (no mobility from
Patch 1). In addition, reductions in the final Patch 1 epidemic size for some mobility
values accompanied by increments in the final epidemic size in Patch 2 are observed.
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Figure 4.7: Scenario One: Final Sizes for Worst Case (Top) and Best Case (Bottom).
The results of simulations collected in Figures 4.5 and Figure 4.6 show similar
final size epidemic curves for both cases. However, it is important to mention that
while Patch 1 experiences some benefits from most mobility patterns, the increments
on the total final epidemic size in Patch 2 are greater. Thus while mobility may
provide benefits within Patch 1 (under the above assumptions) the fact remains that
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it does it at a cost to Patch 2. In short, it is also observed that the final epidemic
size per patch does not respond linearly to changes in mobility even when only p12 is
increased (see Figure 4.7).
The Role of Risk Heterogeneity in the Dynamics of Zika Virus Transmis-
sion
Moreover, the results presented thus far only provide partial information of the total
impact that short term mobility might have on the transmission dynamics of ZIKV.
The impact of risk heterogeneity on ZIKV dynamics within the overall two-patch
system requires the numerical estimation of the global reproduction number as a
function of the mobility matrix P. By fixing the mobility from Patch 2 to Patch 1,
the simulations focused only on the impact of changes in mobility from Patch 1 to
Patch 2.
Using the previously defined scenarios (R01 = 1.52, 2), simulations are carried
out, again assuming equal population sizes (N1 = N2). However, when looking at the
impact of changes in risk on Patch 2 (R02 = 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, and 0.5), simulations
identify a growing final epidemic size as risk in Patch 2 increases for all residence times
in the “worst case” and for the most realistic residency times in the “best case.”
Specifically, Figure 4.8 captures the overall reductions on the global reproductive
number (risk) for all residence times, while identifying the existence of a residence
time interval for which mobility is beneficial (in some cases), decreasing the total
size of the outbreak in the two patch system, when compared to the baseline case
(p12 = 0). An expected outcome as a result of the myriad of assumptions that
have been incorporated, namely, the restrictions placed on population density; the
population in Patch 1 is the same as that in Patch 2.
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Figure 4.8: Scenario One: Total Final Size and Global Basic Reproductive
Number Through Mobility Values When p21 = 0.10, R02 Varies and R01 =
1.52 (Top); 2 (Bottom).
The Role of Population Size Heterogeneity in the Dynamics of Zika Virus
Transmission.
The role of population density on the total final epidemic size and global basic re-
productive number are now explored using the two scenarios previously defined, but
now under the assumption that patch densities (population sizes) are different. More
specifically, when N1 = N2, 5N2, 10N2 and when N2 = 5N1, 10N1. Figure 4.9 shows
that difference in population sizes do matter. Specifically, it is observed that (under
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the densities selected) great density differences translate into higher final epidemic
sizes when the high risk patch is denser.
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Figure 4.9: Scenario One: Total Final Size and Global Basic Reproductive Number
Through Mobility Values When p21 = 0.10 Population Size Varies, R02 = 0.9, and
R01 = 1.52 (Top); 2 (Bottom).
In the “worst case” scenario, infecting over 90% of the population is possible for
some population densities. In addition, it is also observed that despite increases in the
total final epidemic size, as mobility changes, the global R0 decrease monotonically,
for most residence times, but only falls below unity when the safe population is much
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greater. A sensible degree of magnification on the spread of the disease is observed
as residence times change, whenever the differences between N1 and N2 are not too
extreme. In fact, it is possible for mobility to be beneficial in the control of ZIKV
under the above simplistic extreme scenarios. Nonetheless, simulations continue to
show that under the prescribed conditions and assumptions, model generated ZIKV
outbreaks remain unrealistically high.
For the two epidemiological scenarios R01 = 2 and R01 = 1.52, Tables 4.5 and 4.6
provide a summary of the average proportion of infected for low (p12 = 0.01− 0.33),
intermediate (p12 = 0.34−0.66) and high mobility (p12 = 0.67−0.99) when p21 = 0.10.
The role of population scaling (N1 = N2/10, N2/5, N2, 5N2 and 10N2 when the largest
population is 10000) is once again explored.
Table 4.5: Scenario One: Final Size (Patch 1, Patch 2), R01 = 2, R02 = 0.9 and
p21 = 0.10.
N2 Low Mobility Intermediate Mobility High Mobility Min R0
N1 = N2/10 (0.3799, 0.1669) (0.1383, 0.0736) (0.0309, 0.0248) 0.9857
N1 = N2/5 (0.8125, 0.4068) (0.7341, 0.4324) (0.5011, 0.4362) 1.0775
N1 = N2 (0.9572, 0.5419) (0.9513, 0.6141) (0.8651, 0.8064) 1.4954
N1 = 5N2 (0.9713, 0.5215) (0.9706, 0.5886) (0.9461, 0.8626) 1.8457
N1 = 10N2 (0.9726, 0.4905) (0.9722, 0.5659) (0.9598, 0.8654) 1.9173
66
Table 4.6: Scenario One: Final Size (Patch 1, Patch 2), R01 = 1.52, R02 = 0.9 and
p21 = 0.10.
N2 Low Mobility Intermediate Mobility High Mobility Min R0
N1 = N2/10 (0.0045, 0.0020) (0.0036, 0.0018) (0.0026, 0.0014) 0.9289
N1 = N2/5 (0.1766, 0.0746) (0.0687, 0.0364) (0.0139, 0.0023) 0.9643
N1 = N2 (0.7913, 0.3846) (0.7806, 0.4321) (0.6465, 0.5783) 1.1853
N1 = 5N2 (0.8472, 0.3796) (0.8470, 0.4093) (0.7965, 0.6948) 1.4141
N1 = 10N2 (0.8518, 0.3493) (0.8513, 0.3809) (0.8214, 0.7028) 1.4630
Figure 4.10: Scenario One: Effect of Mobility and Population Size Proportions on
the Global Basic Reproductive Number R0 When R02 = 0.9, and R01 = 1.52.
However, potential changes in mobility patterns that host populations may cause
or experience in response to ZIKV dynamics are being completely ignored when a
mobility matrix P with constant entries pij is used. Nonetheless, the qualitative
response of the final epidemic size within Patch 1 is qualitatively similar in both, the
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worst and best case scenarios: increasing at first (for low mobility values), decreasing
after a certain threshold and then eventually crossing down the baseline case, under
some mobility regimes. Moreover, while the qualitative behavior of the final epidemic
size in Patch 2 grows monotonically as mobility increases, reductions in risk and
density yield significant benefits in terms of the total ZIKV burden even under such
restrictive conditions and assumptions (see Figure 4.10).
4.5.2 Risk Defined by Poor Vector Control.
Similarly, the “best case” scenario presented in Figure 4.11 shows that while some
mobility values can increase the final Patch 1 epidemic size, simulations suggest the
existence of a mobility threshold from which the final epidemic size in Patch 1 benefits.
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Figure 4.11: Scenario Two: Patch Incidence and Final Size Proportions for p21 =
0.10, p12 = 0, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.6 for Best Case.
Moreover, the ”worst case” presented in Figure 4.12 shows that while mobility
benefits the overall burden in Patch 1, increases in the total number of infections is
the norm in Patch 2. The results suggest that the overall burden increases since, the
negative impact in Patch 2 is greater than the benefits from Patch 1 (populations are
assumed to be the same size).
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Figure 4.12: Scenario Two: Patch Incidence and Final Size Proportions for p21 =
0.10, p12 = 0, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.6 for Worst Case.
The results depicted in Figure 4.13 suggest that for most p12 mobility levels, the
cumulative final ZIKV epidemic size supports monotonic growth in the total number
of infected individuals.
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Figure 4.13: Scenario Two Final Sizes for Worst (Top) and Best (Bottom) Cases.
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The Role of Risk Heterogeneity in the Dynamics of Zika Virus Transmis-
sion
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Figure 4.14: Scenario Two: Total Final Size and Global Basic Reproductive
Number Through Mobility Values When p21 = 0.10, R02 Varies and R01 =
1.52 (Top); 2 (Bottom).
Once again, when looking at the impact of changes in risk on Patch 2 (R02 =
0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, and 0.5), simulations identify a growing final epidemic size as risk
increases, for all residence times in the “worst case” and most realistic residency
times in the “best case.” However, if the conditions in the safe patch (Patch 2) are
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improved then short term mobility has a positive impact on the final size for certain
mobility patterns. An expected outcome, but the impact is not enough to control the
ZIKV outbreak when both patches have the same population size (see Figure 4.14 ).
The Role of Population Size Heterogeneity in the Dynamics of Zika Virus
Transmission.
Now, the role of population density on the total final epidemic size and global basic
reproductive number are explored. Using the two scenarios previously defined, and
the following population sizes: N1 = N2, 5N2, 10N2 and N2 = 5N1, 10N1. Figure
4.15 shows that difference in population sizes do matter. Specifically, it is observed
that (under the densities selected) great density differences translate into higher final
epidemic sizes when the high risk patch is denser.
Once again, infecting over 90% of the population is possible for some population
densities under the “worst case” scenario. Similarly, despite increases in the total
final epidemic size, the global R0 decrease monotonically for most residence times,
but only falls below unity when the safe population is much greater. Nonetheless,
simulations continue to show that under the prescribed conditions and assumptions,
model generated ZIKV outbreaks remain unrealistically high.
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Figure 4.15: Scenario Two: Total Final Size and Global Basic Reproductive Number
Through Mobility Values When p21 = 0.10, Population Size Varies, R02 = 0.9, and
R01 = 1.52 (Top); 2 (Bottom).
Similarly, for the two epidemiological scenarios R01 = 2 and R01 = 1.52, Tables
4.7 and 4.8 provide a summary of the average proportion of infected for low (p12 =
0.01 − 0.33), intermediate (p12 = 0.34 − 0.66) and high mobility (p12 = 0.67 − 0.99)
when p21 = 0.10. The role of population scaling (N1 = N2/10, N2/5, N2, 5N2 and
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10N2 when the largest population is 10000) is also explored.
Table 4.7: Scenario Two: Final Size (Patch 1, Patch 2), R01 = 2, R02 = 0.9 and
p21 = 0.10.
N2 Low Mobility Intermediate Mobility High Mobility Min R0
N1 = N2/10 (0.3759, 0.1645) (0.1372, 0.0730) (0.0308, 0.0247) 0.9857
N1 = N2/5 (0.8062, 0.3986) (0.7272, 0.4250) (0.4934, 0.4286) 1.0775
N1 = N2 (0.9525, 0.5260) (0.9461, 0.5990) (0.8568, 0.7959) 1.4954
N1 = 5N2 (0.9673, 0.5048) (0.9666, 0.5729) (0.9403, 0.8538) 1.8457
N1 = 10N2 (0.9687, 0.4744) (0.9682, 0.5509) (0.9549, 0.8569) 1.9173
Table 4.8: Scenario Two: Final Size (Patch 1, Patch 2), R01 = 1.52, R02 = 0.9 and
p21 = 0.10.
N2 Low Mobility Intermediate Mobility High Mobility Min R0
N1 = N2/10 (0.0045, 0.0020) (0.0036, 0.0018) (0.0026, 0.0014) 0.9289
N1 = N2/5 (0.1748, 0.0737) (0.0683, 0.0362) (0.0139, 0.0109) 0.9643
N1 = N2 (0.7808, 0.3740) (0.7701, 0.4213) (0.6361, 0.5679) 1.1853
N1 = 5N2 (0.8362, 0.3675) (0.8359, 0.3969) (0.7844, 0.6834) 1.4141
N1 = 10N2 (0.8407, 0.3378) (0.8401, 0.3691) (0.8093, 0.6915) 1.4630
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Figure 4.16: Scenario Two: Effect of Mobility and Population Size Proportions on
the Global Basic Reproductive Number R0 When R02 = 0.9, and R01 = 1.52.
Consequently, the qualitative response of the final epidemic size within Patch 1 is
qualitatively similar in both, the worst and best case scenarios. Moreover, reductions
in risk and density do yield significant benefits in terms of the total ZIKV burden
even under such restrictive conditions and assumptions (see Figure 4.16).
4.5.3 Risk Defined by Poor Bite Prevention and Poor Vector Control.
Figure 4.17 (top), shows the incidence and final ZIKV epidemic size when Patch 1
is under the “worst case scenario,” defined by elevated risk and a basic reproduction
number of R01 = 2. Figure 4.17 shows that around p12 = 0.2, the final number of
infected residents in Patch 1 starts to decrease from the number of infections caused
by the baseline scenario whenp12 = 0.
76
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Time
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Infected Patch 1
p12 = 0%
p12 = 20%
p12 = 40%
p12 = 60%
200 400 600 800 1000
Time
0.8
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
Final Size Patch 1
p12 = 0%
p12 = 20%
p12 = 40%
p12 = 60%
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Time
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
Infected Patch 2
p12 = 0%
p12 = 20%
p12 = 40%
p12 = 60%
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Time
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Final Size Patch 2
p12 = 0%
p12 = 20%
p12 = 40%
p12 = 60%
Figure 4.17: Scenario Three: Patch Incidence and Final Size Proportions for p21 =
0.10, p12 = 0, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.6 for Worst Case.
This worst case scenario for Patch 1 takes place when only Patch 2 residents
are mobile, driving ZIKV infections in almost 96% of the population in Patch 1, an
unrealistic value. Nonetheless, simulated p12 values greater than 0.2 show a beneficial
reduction in the final Patch 1 epidemic size, reaching infection levels below the baseline
case; a clear benefit of mobility.
Figure 4.17 highlights the case when the final Patch 2 epidemic size grows as mo-
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bility from Patch 1 increases, when compared with the baseline case (no mobility from
Patch 1). In addition, reductions in the final Patch 1 epidemic size for some mobility
values accompanied by increments in the final Patch 2 epidemic size are observed.
Again, when compared to the baseline case (no mobility from Patch 1). However,
while mobility may provide benefits within Patch 1 (under the above assumptions)
the fact remains that it does it at a cost to Patch 2. In short, it is also observed that
the final epidemic size per patch does not respond linearly to changes in mobility even
when only the mobility p12 is increased (see Figures 4.17 and 4.18).
Consider now the “best case” scenario, when the basic reproductive number is
R01 = 1.52 and once again under the assumption that the population in Patch 1 is
the same as that in Patch 2. The results of simulations collected in Figure 4.18 show
similar final size epidemic curves to those generated in the previous case (the “worst
case” scenario for Patch 1). While some mobility values can increase the final Patch 1
epidemic size, the maximum epidemic size only reaches around 80% of the population
when mobility is close to p12 = 0.20. Again, an unrealistic level, even when it was
lower than in the “worst’ case scenario as expected. Finally, once again observations
from the simulations suggest the existence of a mobility threshold from which the
final epidemic sizes in Patch 1 benefits.
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Figure 4.18: Scenario Three: Patch Incidence and Final Size Proportions for p21 =
0.10, p12 = 0, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.6 for Best Case.
The results depicted in Figure 4.18 suggest that under all p12 mobility levels, Patch
2 final ZIKV epidemic size supports monotonic growth in the total number of infected
individuals. Moreover, the results presented thus far only provide partial information
of the total impact that short term mobility might have on the transmission dynamics
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of ZIKV. An expected outcome as a result of the myriad of assumptions that have
been incorporated, namely, the restrictions placed on population density; the popu-
lation in Patch 1 is the same as that in Patch 2. By fixing the mobility from Patch 2
to that of Patch 1, the simulations focused only on the impact of changes in mobility
from Patch 1 to Patch 2. Further, potential changes in mobility patterns that host
populations may cause or experience in response to ZIKV dynamics are being com-
pletely ignored when a mobility matrix P with constant entries pij is used. However,
even under such specific restrictions and assumptions, the qualitative response of the
final epidemic size within Patch 1 is qualitatively similar in both, the worst and best
case scenarios: increasing at first (for low mobility values), decreasing after a certain
threshold and then eventually crossing down the baseline case, under some mobility
regimes. Furthermore, the qualitative behavior of the final epidemic size in Patch 2
grows monotonically as mobility increases (see Figure 4.19).
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Figure 4.19: Scenario Three Final Sizes for Worst (Top) and Best (Bottom) Cases.
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The Role of Risk Heterogeneity in the Dynamics of Zika Virus Transmis-
sion.
The impact of risk heterogeneity on ZIKV dynamics within the overall two-patch
system is explored, an analysis that requires the numerical estimation of the global
reproduction number as a function of the mobility matrix P. Using the previously
defined scenarios (R01 = 1.52, 2), simulations are carried out, again assuming equal
population sizes (N1 = N2). However, when looking at the impact of changes in risk on
Patch 2 (R02 = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9), simulations identify a growing epidemic in Patch
2 as risk increases with the overall community experiencing nonlinear changes in risk
as residency times change from the baseline scenario given by p12 = 0. Specifically,
Figure 4.20 captures the overall reductions on the global reproductive number (risk)
for all residence times, while identifying the existence of a residence time interval for
which mobility is beneficial, decreasing the total size of the outbreak in the two patch
system, when compared to the baseline case (p12 = 0).
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Figure 4.20: Scenario Three: Total Final Size and Global Basic Reproduc-
tive Number Through Mobility Values When p21 = 0.10, R02 Varies and R01 =
1.52 (Top); 2 (Bottom).
In the case when mobility from Patch 1 is halted (p12 = 0), the final epidemic size
increases as R0i (risk) increases. While simulations suggest that mobility can slow
down the speed of the outbreak (smaller global R0), simulation also re-affirm the
obvious; the existence of a high risk, mobile and well connected patch, can serve as
a disease source or an outbreak magnifier; a situation that has been explored within
an n-patch system under various connective schemes (Bichara et al., 2015; Castillo-
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Chavez et al., 2016). Moreover, it is observed that the global reproductive number R0
experiences reductions for almost all mobility values. Nonetheless, R0 never drops
below unity for the two-patch scenarios selected in this study. Hence, under such
assumptions and scenarios, it is seen that the use of fixed mobility patterns make
the eliminating ZIKV extremely difficult, if not impossible, under the two scenarios.
Figure 4.20 provides an example that highlights the relationship between the global
reproductive number and the corresponding final epidemic size.
The Role of Population Size Heterogeneity in the Dynamics of Zika Virus
Transmission.
The role of population density on the total final epidemic size and global basic re-
productive number are now explored using the two scenarios previously defined, but
now under the assumption that patch densities (population sizes) are different. More
specifically, when N1 = N2, 5N2, 10N2 and N2 = 5N1, 10N1.
It is observed that difference in population sizes do matter. Specifically, it is
observed that (under the densities selected) great density differences translate into
higher final epidemic sizes. In the “worst case” scenario, infecting 90% of the pop-
ulation is possible for some global reproductive numbers exhibiting certain mobility
patterns (see Figure 4.21). It is observed that despite increases in the total final
epidemic size, as mobility changes, the global R0 decrease monotonically, for most
residence times, but never falling below unity. A sensible degree of magnification on
the spread of the disease is observed as residence times change, whenever the differ-
ences between N1 and N2 are not too extreme. In fact, it is possible for mobility to
be beneficial in the control of ZIKV under the above simplistic extreme scenarios.
Nonetheless, simulations continue to show that under the prescribed conditions and
assumptions, model generated ZIKV outbreaks remain unrealistically high.
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Figure 4.21: Scenario Three: Total Final Size and Global Basic Reproductive Num-
ber Through Mobility Values When p21 = 0.10, Population Size Varies, R02 = 0.9,
and R01 = 1.52 (Top); 2 (Bottom).
Furthermore, the simulations show a minimum global reproductive number when
p12 ≈ 0.90. Figure 4.21 also shows that larger high risk population (N1 >> N2)
exhibit a greater total final epidemic size when individuals from Patch 1 spend more
than half of their time in Patch 2 (see also Figure 4.22).
For the two epidemiological scenariosR01 = 2 andR01 = 1.52, Tables 4.9 and 4.10
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provide a summary of the average proportion of infected for low (p12 = 0.01− 0.33),
intermediate (p12 = 0.34−0.66) and high mobility (p12 = 0.67−0.99) when p21 = 0.10.
The role of population scaling (N1 = N2/10, N2/5, N2, 5N2 and 10N2 when the largest
population is 10000) is also explored.
Table 4.9: Scenario Three: Final Size (Patch 1, Patch 2), R01 = 2, R02 = 0.9 and
p21 = 0.10.
N2 Low Mobility Intermediate Mobility High Mobility Min R0
N1 = N2/10 (0.3819, 0.1678) (0.1387, 0.0738) (0.0309, 0.0248) 0.9857
N1 = N2/5 (0.8167, 0.4097) (0.7376, 0.4349) (0.5036, 0.4385) 1.0775
N1 = N2 (0.9609, 0.5487) (0.9550, 0.6213) (0.8701, 0.8124) 1.4954
N1 = 5N2 (0.9746, 0.5296) (0.9739, 0.5985) (0.9506, 0.8692) 1.8457
N1 = 10N2 (0.9757, 0.4989) (0.9753, 0.5766) (0.9638, 0.8722) 1.9173
Table 4.10: Scenario Three: Final Size (Patch 1, Patch 2), R01 = 1.52, R02 = 0.9
and p21 = 0.10.
N2 Low Mobility Intermediate Mobility High Mobility Min R0
N1 = N2/10 (0.0045, 0.0020) (0.0036, 0.0018) (0.0026, 0.0014) 0.9289
N1 = N2/5 (0.1773, 0.0748) (0.0688, 0.0364) (0.0139, 0.0109) 0.9643
N1 = N2 (0.7959, 0.3875) (0.7847, 0.4352) (0.6499, 0.5816) 1.1853
N1 = 5N2 (0.8522, 0.3832) (0.8519, 0.4137) (0.8017, 0.6996) 1.4141
N1 = 10N2 (0.8568, 0.3529) (0.8563, 0.3855) (0.8267, 0.7077) 1.4630
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Figure 4.22: Scenario Three: Effect of Mobility and Population Size Proportions on
the Global Basic Reproductive Number R0 When R02 = 0.9, and R01 = 1.52.
The results collected suggest that short-term mobility plays an important role in
ZIKV dynamics, under a system involving two highly heterogeneous patches. Simula-
tions also suggest that, even though mobility can reduce the global basic reproductive
number, in most cases it is not enough to eliminate an outbreak or make a significant
difference under the scenarios explored.
4.6 Conclusions and Discussion.
This study focuses on the dynamics of a single outbreak, albeit the modeling
framework can be used to study long-term dynamics when the mobility patterns can
be captured effectively by P. A two-patch model where host-mobility is modeled
using a Lagrangian approach is used to help understand the role of host-movement
on the transmission dynamics of ZIKV. The patches were defined to be as distinct
as they could be, hoping that simulations, in this simplified system, could capture
some insight on the transmission dynamics of ZIKV in the presence of extreme health
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disparities within neighboring communities or within urban centers. This framework
can be used to study the dynamics of vector born diseases within a collection of
neighboring communities or neighborhoods experiencing multiple levels of health dis-
parities and diverse connectivity mobility structures (Bichara and Castillo-Chavez,
2016). The study of the role of mobility at larger scales can be best captured using
question-specific related models that account for the possibility of long-term mobility
(see for example (Herrera-Valdez et al., 2011; Chowell et al., 2003b; Baroyan et al.,
1971; Rvachev and Longini Jr, 1985; Elveback et al., 1976; Banks and Castillo-Chavez,
2003; Khan et al., 2009)).
Although the goal is not to fit specific outbreaks or specific situations, recently
published parameter ranges were used since framing the system within the range of
ZIKV accepted parameters helps highlight the impact that mobility may have within
two highly distinct (bi-modal) communities in a more realistic way. The incorporation
of a Lagrangian modeling approach to study epidemic outbreaks makes it possible to
use measurable parameters like risk (βˆ), which affect individuals differently depending
on the patch-residency times their mobility patterns (residency times).
As a result, the impact of ZIKV can be assessed locally (at the patch level) or
globally (regional level, in this case two patch system). System risk assessment was
carried out via the computation of the system R0, which must be carried out via
the numerical solution of a system of nonlinear equations. Specifically, changes on
the system R0 were computed (with respect to residency times) and compared to
the local R0i in the absence of mobility. Further, the mobility-dependent system
final epidemic sizes were computed via simulations. These final sizes helped asses the
impact of mobility (and risk) locally and globally, within the two selected scenarios,
(R01 = 1.52 and R01 = 2). As expected, the impact of mobility on the final epidemic
size depends on the local risk of infection and population size. Moreover, it was
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also determined that there are certain cases in which mobility could be detrimental,
highlighting the necessity to reduce health disparities in vulnerable communities. In
fact, mobility from high to low risk patches can reduce or increase the total final
epidemic size; mobility could be used as a strategy to ameliorate the impact of ZIKV
outbreaks.
The challenges posed by policies that may be beneficial to the system but detri-
mental are also explored within this two-patch system. Situations where the total
final epidemic size increased as R02 increased and situations where the total final
epidemic size decreased under low mobility values when R02 ∼ 1 were documented.
Population density does make a difference and examples when R02 < 1 with mobil-
ity incapable of reducing the total final epidemic size under no differences in patch
density (here measured by total population size in each patch, both assumed to have
roughly the same area) were also identified. Differences in population density were
also shown to be capable of generating reductions on the total final epidemic size
within some mobility regimes.
The highly simplified two-patch model used seem to have shed some light on the
role of mobility on the spread of ZIKV in areas where huge differences in the availabil-
ity of public health programs and services,–the result of endemic crime, generalized
violence and neglect– exist. Model simulations also seemed to have shed some light
on the potential relevance of the factors not accounted for. The value of the use of
single patch-specific risk parameters (βˆ) has strengths and limitations. It is impor-
tant to notice that the model used did not account explicitly for changes in the levels
of infection within the vector population nor does it account for impact of substantial
differences in patch vector population sizes. The simplified model fails to account
for the responses to outbreaks by patch residents as individuals may alter mobility
patterns, use more protective clothing, and respond individually and independently
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of official control programs in response to dramatic increases on vector population or
a surge in cases. Clearly, the use of two patches and assumptions do limit the out-
comes that such a system can support. Communities can’t, in general, be modeled
under a highly differentiated two-tier system and in the case of ZIKV, the possibility
of vertical transmission in humans and vectors as well as sexually-transmitted ZIV
can’t be completely neglected (Brauer et al., 2016). The introduction of changes in
behavior in response to individuals’ assessment of the levels of risk infection over time
needs to be addressed (Castillo-Chavez et al., 2016); a challenge that has yet to be
met to the satisfaction of the scientific community involved in the study of epidemio-
logical processes as complex adaptive systems (see for example (Perrings et al., 2014;
Fenichel et al., 2011; Morin et al., 2013)).
The limitations of the role of technology in the absence of the public health in-
frastructure –there is no silver bullet– has been recently addressed in the context of
Ebola (Chowell et al., 2015; Yong et al., 2016) with applications of the Lagrangian
approach as presented here in the context of communicable and vector born diseases,
including dengue, tuberculosis and Ebola, in settings where health disparities are per-
vasive (Espinoza et al., 2016; Moreno et al., 2017a; Bichara et al., 2016). Further, the
use of simplified models, quite often tends to over-estimate the impact of an outbreak
[see (Nishiura et al., 2009, 2011)] and the model and scenarios used highlight the
limitations on the use of simplified settings when the goal is to capture or mimic the
dynamics of specific systems–not the goal of this study.
Certainly, the use of dramatic measures to limit the spread of diseases like SARS,
Influenza or Ebola ((Chowell et al., 2003a; Herrera-Valdez et al., 2011; Chowell et al.,
2015)), as well as the rise of vector born diseases like Dengue and Zika are not un-
common, and the dramatic implications that some measures have had on local and
global economies. The question remains, what can we do to mitigate or limit the
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spread of disease, particularly emergent diseases without disrupting central compo-
nents? Discussions on these issues are recurrent (Fenichel et al., 2011; Morin et al.,
2013), most intensely in the context of SARS, Influenza, Ebola and Zika, in the last
decade or so. The vulnerability of world societies is directly linked to the lack of
action in addressing the challenges faced by the weakest links in the system must
be accepted and acted on by the world community. We need global investments in
communities and nations where health disparities and lack of resources are the norm.
We must invest in research and surveillance within clearly identified world hot spots,
where the emergence of new disease are most likely to emerge, and we must do so
with the involvement, at all levels, of the affected communities (Perrings et al., 2014;
Castillo-Chavez et al., 2015).
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Chapter 5
THE ROLE OF MOBILITY AND HEALTH DISPARITIES ON THE
TRANSMISSION DYNAMICS OF TUBERCULOSIS.
Background The transmission dynamics of Tuberculosis (TB) not only involves mul-
tiple transmission methods but also requires of the incorporation of complex epidemi-
ological and socio-economical interactions between individuals living in highly distinct
regional conditions. The different levels of the methods of transmission (exogenous
reinfection and first time infection) within high-incidence settings may influence the
impact of control programs on TB prevalence.
Methods The goal of this study is to improve the basic understanding of TB dy-
namics via scenarios, within simplified, two patch, risk-defined interconnected envi-
ronments in the presence of short term mobility and variations in reinfection and
infection rates. Using a modeling framework that captures the average proportion
of time spent in places of residency, work or business the role of individuals’ ‘daily’
dynamics within and between TB-risk environments (patches) was estimated. As a
direct result, the effective population size of Patch i at time t must account for both
visitor and residents of Patch i, at time t.
Results The impact that the distribution of individuals’ residence times has on the
effective population size and ultimately on TB transmission and control in different
patches are studied using selected scenarios where risk is defined by the estimated or
perceived first time infection and/or exogenous re-infection rates.
Conclusions The results suggest that allowing infected individuals to move from high
to low TB prevalence areas (where the sharing of treatment and isolation facilities is
possible) may lead to a reduction in the total TB prevalence in the overall (two-patch)
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population under certain conditions.
5.1 Background
Tuberculosis (TB), a communicable disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacterium
tuberculosis, remains among one of the leading causes of death in the world. Accord-
ing to the 2014 World Health Organization’s (WHO) TB report, 9.6 million people
developed symptomatic TB infections and 1.5 million TB-associated deaths (World
Health Organization, 2015). Despite advances in TB research and the existence of
treatment and vaccine, it is estimated that one-third of the world population serves
as TB reservoirs. The majority of these TB reservoirs (latently infected individuals)
live in developing countries where exposure to multiple TB risk factors is common.
More specifically, individuals living in rural areas (mainly in developing countries) and
below the poverty line, disproportionately contribute to the documented TB burden
(Legesse et al., 2010; Ahn et al., 2005); or are exposed to a higher risk of infection.
Recent data analysis has suggested a strong association between poverty and TB in
economically underprivileged countries (Bhatt et al., 2010). Vulnerable groups are at
greater risk of TB infection compared with the general population because of poor
urbanization, overcrowding and substandard living. In addition, poor working con-
ditions, poor nutrition, inter-current diseases, and migration from (or to) higher-risk
patches are also associated with higher risk of acquiring TB (Ahn et al., 2005). Fur-
thermore, the overall worldwide TB-burden continues to rise as the world population
continues to grow rapidly (Lawn and Zumla, 2011), even when the worldwide TB
incidence rates seemed to have peaked in 2004. The study of (Gomes et al., 2012)
suggest that TB-reinfection rates (reinfection after successful treatment), are higher
than TB infection rates (among those with no prior TB-experience). In their study,
they propose two mechanisms to maintain high TB prevalence: (i) past infections
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increase susceptibility to reinfection (ii) differences in susceptibility to infection con-
tribute to increased re-infection rates among the treated; something that needs to
be supported by data. Consequently, (Gomes et al., 2012) noted that, the rates of
reinfection are higher at the population level than at the individual level. Addition-
ally, inappropriate treatment and the use of poor quality drugs in recent years have
led to wild and antibiotic resistant strains contributing to the already high TB-active
incidence and making TB a major global health threat.
Population level studies require the use of metapopulation models that account
for population aggregation at a given patch. Metapopulation type transmission mod-
els offer a powerful set up for the study of TB dynamics and the effectiveness of
population-level TB interventions like treatment, movement restrictions, and local
control measures [see (Castillo Cha´vez et al., 2000)]. Similarly, (Tanaka et al., 2014)
and (Allen et al., 2009) present models aimed at exploring the impact of immigration
in mobile populations within an n-patch system with risk heterogeneity. However,
these models made use of an Eulerian approach where the concepts of residence times
and effective population size were not incorporated; in short this approach does not
allow for the identification (of the place of residency) of treated or quarantined in-
dividuals as well as the impact of the effective population size on the transmission
dynamics. Prior TB-related studies have estimated incidence growth, explored the
impact of TB interventions and the impact of exogenous reinfection, however, move-
ment of individuals that keep track of place of residency have been in general ignored
[see (Castillo Cha´vez et al., 2000)]. Moreover, limited studies have considered mod-
els incorporating movement via mass transportation within a Lagrangian approach
based on budgeting contacts as a function of residency times [see (Castillo Cha´vez
et al., 2000)], taking into account the impact of sudden blips of immigration (Tewa
et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2008; Brauer and van den Driessche, 2001;
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Shim, 2006), co-infections, specially with HIV (Kapitanov, 2015; Nthiiri et al., 2015;
Bhunu et al., 2009; Bowong and Kurths, 2010; Hohmann and Voss-Bo¨hme, 2013;
Roeger et al., 2009), relapse (Gomes et al., 2012; Millet et al., 2013; Marx et al.,
2014; Luzze et al., 2013; Tiemersma et al., 2011), antibiotic, drug, and ultra-drug
resistance (Okuonghae, 2013; Ozcaglar et al., 2012; Bhunu, 2011; Lipsitch and Levin,
1998; Agusto and Adekunle, 2014; Cohen et al., 2009) or TB re-activation and pro-
gression (Feng et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2007; Zheng et al., 2014a), which may be
central to TB re-emergence. In addition, models assuming negligible immigration
might not capture the real TB dynamics in certain populations where high levels of
diversity are caused by immigration (Ozcaglar et al., 2012).
Since research aimed at increasing the understanding of TB transmission dynamics
explicitly incorporating heterogeneous TB-risk environments is limited, the goal of
this study is to increase the basic understanding of the impact residence times and
population sizes, across distinct risk environments have on the transmission dynamics
of TB; when risk is defined in terms of new infections and/or exogenous re-infection
rates. Here, residence time is defined as the average proportion of time an individual
spends daily in a given environment. In particular, the following questions were
addressed:
• How does mobility changes TB prevalence via the trade-off between exogenous
and direct first time infection rates?,
• How differences in TB prevalence and population sizes can influence the impact
of mobility on the total number of infections? and
• Which transmission method, direct first time infection or exogenous re-infection,
is capable of sustaining higher TB prevalence?
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5.2 Methods: TB Dynamic Modeling Framework
A model for the transmission dynamics of TB in two interacting populations
identified by their place of residence was considered. First, a single patch model was
introduced and then a Lagrangian approach via the explicit use of residence time in
order to capture the interacting dynamics of a two patch system was incorporated.
The two-patch residence time model is used to address the role of movement (implicit)
and patch-risk on TB dynamics. Relevant definitions and case studies scenarios ex-
plored in this study are collected in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Definitions and Scenarios for TB
Nomenclature
Risk
Interpreted based on levels of infection rate, prevalence,
or average contacts (via population size)
High-risk patch
Defined either by high direct first time infection rate (i.e., high β
which leads to high corresponding R0) or by high exogenous
re-infection rate (i.e., high δ)
Enhanced socio-economic
conditions
(reducing health disparity)
Defined by better healthcare infrastructure which is incorporated
by high prevalence of a disease (i.e., high I(0)/N) in a large
population (i.e., large N)
Mobility
Captured by average residence times of an individual
in different patches (i.e., by using P matrix)
Scenarios (assume high-risk and diminished socio-economic conditions in
Patch 1 as compared to Patch 2)
Scenario 1 β1 > β2, δ1 = δ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
high risk
;
I1(0)
N1
>
I2(0)
N2
, N1 > N2;︸ ︷︷ ︸
socio-economic conditions
vary p12 when p21 ≈ 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mobility
Scenario 2 β1 = β2, δ1 > δ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
high risk
;
I1(0)
N1
>
I2(0)
N2
, N1 > N2;︸ ︷︷ ︸
socio-economic conditions
vary p12 when p21 ≈ 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mobility
5.2.1 A Simple Single Patch TB Model with Homogenous Mixing
The transmission dynamics of TB in homogeneously mixed population is repre-
sented by a system of three differential equations describing the TB contagion pro-
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cess. The population is divided into three sub-populations each corresponding to
an epidemiological state of the TB contagion process: susceptible individuals (S),
noninfectious infected or latent individuals (L), and actively infectious individuals
(I).
The model considers three contagion pathways: direct progression (fast dynamics),
endogenous reactivation (slow progression, often years after infection) and exogenous
reinfection. A susceptible individual (S) may get infected through contacts with
actively infectious individuals (I), proceeding to either the noninfectious latent class
(L) with probability q or to the actively infectious (I) state with probability (1− q)
where q ∈ [0, 1]. Meaning that the fraction (1− q) denotes the proportion of recently
infected individuals experiencing fast progression and move directly into the infectious
stage (I). On the other hand, reactivation from a longstanding latent infections is
modeled by the transition of individuals from the noninfectious to the infectious state
via endogenous reactivation at the per capita rate γ, or via exogenous reinfection at
the per capita rate δ. Finally, infectious individuals are treated at the per capita rate
ρ moving to the non-infectious infected category L as total mycobacterium elimination
in the human body is assumed to be not possible.
The model assumes the following conditions: (1) the population is constant; (2)
TB-induced deaths are negligible and hence ignored; (3) only a fraction of individuals
are infectious; (4) individuals may recover from an active infection without treatment
moving back to the latent class; (5) latent individuals may relapse and develop active
TB or remain in this class until death due to natural causes (not TB). The flow dia-
gram associated with the transmission dynamics of the TB model used can be found
in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Flow Diagram for the Single Patch Three Compartment TB Model:
Susceptible (S), Infected Latent (L) and Infectious (I).
This model follows the structure used in (Feng et al., 2000; Mccluskey, 2006;
Zheng et al., 2014b) where all three contagion pathways are considered: exogenous
reinfection, fast and slow progression. Similarly, the basic reproduction number as
well as the conditions for the existence and stability equilibria (disease free and en-
demic steady states) are highlighted in (Feng et al., 2000; Mccluskey, 2006; Zheng
et al., 2014b). The basic reproduction number for the model represented in Figure
5.1 is given by the algebraic expression
R0 = β(γ + (1− q)µ)
µ(µ+ ρ+ γ)
(?)
The basic reproduction number (R0) gives the average number of secondary in-
fections generated by a typically infected individual in a population of susceptible
individuals. In ?, it was noticed that in a completely susceptible population there
are only two pathways; slow and fast progression. In addition, in the case were
exogenous reinfection is a pathway to TB contagion and excluding fast progression
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(meaning that q = 1 and δ > 0), it is known that the model can support two stable
equilibria simultaneously (backward bifurcation) (Feng et al., 2000). In consequence,
the role of TB could be closely linked not only to the basic reproductive number (R0),
but also to the initial conditions.
5.2.2 A Two-patch TB Model with Heterogeneity in Population Through
Residence Times
Using the transmission dynamics outlined above and depicted in Figure 5.1, a
two-patch model is now build, under a residency-time matrix P.
Let N1, N2 be the host population of Patch 1 and 2, respectively and pij be
the proportion of time an individual from Patch i spends on average in Patch j.
Consequently, individuals from Patch 1 spend on average, the proportion p11 of their
time in Patch 1 and the proportion p12 of their time in Patch 2 (p11 + p12 = 1).
Similarly, residents of Patch 2 spend p22 of their time in Patch 2 and p21 = 1 − p22
in Patch 1. Hence, without a loss of generality, at any given time t in Patch 1,
the effective population in Patch 1 is p11N1 + p21N2, while the effective population
of Patch 2 at time t is p12N1 + p22N2. Again, susceptible individuals from Patch 1
(S1) may become infected in Patch 1 (p11S1) or in Patch 2 (p12S2). Similarly, using
this Lagrangian approach that provides an implicit way to capture the movement of
individuals, the effective proportion of infectious individuals in Patch 1 at time t is
p11I1 + p21I2
p11N1 + p21N2
.
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Figure 5.2: Schematic Description of the Lagrangian Approach Between Two
Patches.
Hence, the transmission dynamics between infectious and susceptible residents
from Patch 1 are given by
S˙1 = µ1N1 − β1p11S1 p11I1 + p21I2
p11N1 + p21N2
− β2p12S1 p12I1 + p22I2
p12N1 + p22N2
− µ1S1. (5.1)
Subsequently, the latency dynamics among residents from Patch 1 are,
L˙1 = qβ1p11S1
p11I1 + p21I2
p11N1 + p21N2
+ qβ2p12S1
p12I1 + p22I2
p12N1 + p22N2
− δ1p11L1 p11I1 + p21I2
p11N1 + p21N2
− δ2p12L1 p12I1 + p22I2
p12N1 + p22N2
− (γ1 + µ1)L1 + ρ1I1. (5.2)
Finally, the dynamics in which residents from Patch 1 reach the infectious state are
I˙1 = (1− q)β1p11S1 p11I1 + p21I2
p11N1 + p21N2
+ (1− q)β2p12S1 p12I1 + p22I2
p12N1 + p22N2
+ δ1p11L1
p11I1 + p21I2
p11N1 + p21N2
+ δ2p12L1
p12I1 + p22I2
p12N1 + p22N2
+ γ1L1 − (µ1 + ρ1)I1. (5.3)
Using (5.1), (5.2),(5.3), that describe TB dynamics in one patch, the transmission
dynamics for a two patch system are given by the following System ( i = 1, 2):
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
S˙i = µiNi −
∑2
j=1 βjpijSi
∑2
k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk
− µiSi,
L˙i = q
∑2
j=1 βjpijSi
∑2
k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk
−∑2j=1 δjpijLi ∑2k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk
− (γi + µi)Li + ρiIi,
I˙i = (1− q)
∑2
j=1 βjpijSi
∑2
k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk
+
∑2
j=1 δjpijLi
∑2
k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk
+ γiLi − (µi + ρi)Ii.
(5.4)
Notice that the total population of Patch i, i = 1, 2 could be also represented by
Ni = Si + Li + Ii. Moreover, System (5.4) has the same qualitative dynamics as the
following reduced system, since the total population is constant: L˙i = q
∑2
j=1 βjpij(Ni − Li − Ii)
∑2
k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk
−∑2j=1 δjpijLi ∑2k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk
− (γi + µi)Li + ρiIi,
I˙i =
∑2
j=1 pij
(
(1− q)βj(Ni − Li − Ii) + δjLi
) ∑2
k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk
+ γiLi − (µi + ρi)Ii.
(5.5)
A schematic description of the two-patch dynamical model is provided in Figure 5.2
and the description of the parameters used as well as estimates from previous studies
can be found in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Description of the Parameters Used in System (5.5)
Parameters Description Ranges(units)
βi Susceptibility to TB invasion in Patch i 0.01 - 0.0192 (y
−1)
δi Susceptibility to exogenous TB progression in Patch i 0.0026 - 0.0053 (y
−1)
µi Natural birth and death (per capita) 0.0104 - 0.0143 (y
−1)
ρ Relapse (per capita) 0.0010 - 0.0083(y−1)
γi Activation from latency in Patch i (per capita) 0.0017 - 0.0036 (y
−1)
q Proportion of individuals that develop latent TB 0.9 (dimensionless)
pij Proportion of time that residents of Patch i spend in Patch j Varies (dimensionless)
For parameter ranges, see (Cohen et al., 2007; Blower et al., 1995; Gomes et al.,
2004; Okuonghae, 2013; Dowdy et al., 2012; Langley et al., 2014) .
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5.3 Results
5.3.1 Model Analysis
The disease-free equilibrium of System (5.5) is located at the origin of the positive
orthant R4+, that is E0 = 0R4+ . The basic reproduction number (R0) of System (5.5) is
computed following the next generation method described in (Van den Driessche and
Watmough, 2002; Diekmann et al., 1990). System (5.5) was then decomposed into
two vectors: the “new infection” vector, denoted by F , and the “transition” vector,
denoted by V . Hence,

L˙1
L˙2
E˙1
E˙2

= F + V
=

q
∑2
j=1 βjp1j(N1 − L1 − I1)
∑2
k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk
q
∑2
j=1 βjp2j(N2 − L2 − I2)
∑2
k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk
(1− q)∑2j=1 βjp1j(N1 − L1 − I1) ∑2k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk
(1− q)∑2j=1 βjp2j(N2 − L2 − I2) ∑2k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk

+
+

−∑2j=1 δjp1jL1 ∑2k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk
− (γ1 + µ1)L1 + ρ1I1
−∑2j=1 δjp2jL2 ∑2k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk
− (γ2 + µ2)L2 + ρ2I2∑2
j=1 p1jδjL1
∑2
k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk
+ γL1 − (µ1 + ρ1)I1∑2
j=1 p2jδjL2
∑2
k=1 pkjIk∑2
k=1 pkjNk
+ γL2 − (µ2 + ρ2)I2

The rationale behind the presence of nonlinear terms, which represent the infec-
tiousness progression of latent by the interaction with infectious individuals, in the
“transition” vector (V) is that these terms do not, technically, represent “new infec-
tions”. Letting F and V be the Jacobian matrices of F and V respectively, evaluated
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at the disease free equilibrium E0, then the basic reproduction number is the spectral
radius of the next generation matrix −FV −1 (Van den Driessche and Watmough,
2002; Diekmann et al., 1990). Hence, R0 = ρ(−FV −1) where
−FV −1 =

qγ1k11 qγ2k12 q(µ1 + γ1)k11 q(µ2 + γ2)k21
qγ1k21 qγ2k22 q(µ1 + γ1)k21 q(µ2 + γ2)k22
(1− q)γ1k11 (1− q)γ2k12 (1− q)(µ1 + γ1)k11 (1− q)(µ2 + γ2)k12
(1− q)γ1k21 (1− q)γ2k22 (1− q)(µ1 + γ1)k21 (1− q)(µ2 + γ2)k22

where
k11 =
(
β1p
2
11N1
p11N1 + p21N2
+
β2p
2
12N1
p12N1 + p22N2
)
1
µ1(γ1 + µ1 + ρ1)
=
(
β1p
2
11N1
p11N1 + p21N2
+
β2p
2
12N1
p12N1 + p22N2
) R01
β1(γ1 + (1− q)µ1) ,
k12 =
(
β1p11p21N1
p11N1 + p21N2
+
β2p12p22N1
p12N1 + p22N2
)
1
µ2(γ2 + µ2 + ρ2)
=
(
β1p11p21N1
p11N1 + p21N2
+
β2p12p22N1
p12N1 + p22N2
) R02
β2(γ2 + (1− q)µ2) ,
k21 =
(
β1p11p21N2
p11N1 + p21N2
+
β2p12p22N2
p12N1 + p22N2
)
1
µ1(γ1 + µ1 + ρ1)
=
(
β1p11p21N2
p11N1 + p21N2
+
β2p12p22N2
p12N1 + p22N2
) R01
β1(γ1 + (1− q)µ1) ,
and
k22 =
(
β1p
2
21N2
p11N1 + p21N2
+
β2p
2
22N2
p12N1 + p22N2
)
1
µ2(γ2 + µ2 + ρ2)
=
(
β1p
2
21N2
p11N1 + p21N2
+
β2p
2
22N2
p12N1 + p22N2
) R02
β2(γ2 + (1− q)µ2) .
Note that R0 = f(P,R01,R02) where R01 and R02 are the basic reproductive
numbers of patch 1 and 2, respectively, when there is no movement (p11 = 1 =
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p22). Recall that P = (pij)1≤i,j≤2 is the residence times matrix of the model and
corresponding expressions for R01 and R02 are given by the algebraic expression (?).
The analysis from Model (5.5) suggests a sharp threshold (that is, the disease
dies out from both patches if R0 ≤ 1 or persists in both patches otherwise), when
q = 1 and δ = 0 (i.e., in the absence of fast progression and exogenous infections)
since the corresponding residence times matrix is irreducible. (See (Bichara et al.,
2015; Bichara and Castillo-Chavez, 2016; Bichara et al., 2016) for the mathematical
proofs). By assuming q = 1 through out this study and δ > 0, numerical simulations
suggest complex dynamics (i.e., multiple non-trivial equilibria) for the system.
Figure 5.3: Dynamics of Infectious and Latent When the Two Patches Are Strongly
Connected and R0 > 1.
Figure 5.3 highlights this robustness. Using four different sets of initial conditions,
the trajectories of latently infected individuals (Figure 5.3 left) and actively-infected
individuals (Figure 5.3 right) converge towards the endemic state as time progresses.
On the other hand, the case when R0 ≤ 1, leads to the eventual elimination of the
disease from both patches regardless of the initial conditions as shown in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: The Infectious and Latent Populations in the Two Patches Converge to
Zero for Four Different Initial Conditions When R0 ≤ 1.
Assuming Patch 1 is high risk (R0 > 1) and the connectivity between the two
patches is not strong (p21 ≈ 0 and p12 ≈ 0), then the disease will persist in both
patches, even though the number of latently-infected and actively-infectious individ-
uals in Patch 2 is small (See Figure 5.5).
Figure 5.5: Dynamics of Two Weakly Connected Patches When R0 > 1 Reach an
Endemic Level but Patch 2 Approaches a Lower Level of Endemicity (R01 = 1.4150
and R02 = 0.1417) If Completely Isolated.
The effects of the residence times matrix P = (pij)1≤i,j≤2 on the basic reproduction
number R0(P) and, consequently on the disease dynamics, are highlighted in Figure
5.6 and Figure 5.7. Notice that the basic reproduction number is a decreasing function
of the residence time of high risk residents (Patch 1) in the low risk environment
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(Patch 2), in this case p12. This reduction is capable to ultimately drive the basic
reproduction number to a value less than one and consequently drive the latent and
infected populations, under such mobility schedules, to zero in both patches (See
Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7).
Figure 5.6: Effects of the Residence Time Matrix on the Basic Reproduction Number
and the Disease Dynamics of the Latent Class.
Figure 5.7: Effects of the Residence Time Matrix on the Basic Reproduction Number
and the Disease Dynamics of the Infected Class.
Now, the role of mobility, risk and health disparities on TB prevalence levels in a
two patch setting need to be addressed. In the next section, the role of the parameters
representing mobility, risk and health disparities, on the dynamics of TB are explored.
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5.3.2 The Role of Risk and Mobility on TB Prevalence.
Now, the dynamics of tuberculosis within a two-patch setting, described in Model
(5.5), under various residence times schemes, are highlighted via numerical experi-
ments. These numerical experiments were carried out using the two-patch Lagrangian
modeling framework on pre-constructed scenarios. In particular, it is assumed that
one of the two regions (say, Patch 1) has high TB prevalence and consequently has
a higher risk of infection. While the scenarios simulated might be representative of
certain regions, this study does not model specific cities or regions. See Table 5.1 for
nomenclature and scenarios explored in this section.
The interconnection of individuals between the two idealized highly heterogeneous
patches demands that individuals from Patch 1 travel to the “safer” Patch 2 driven by
social factors like work, school or for other social activities. Likewise, it is assumed
that the same socio-economic factors prevents individuals from the safer patch to
travel and hence, the proportion of time that Patch 2-residents spend in Patch 1 is
negligible.
In this study “high risk” is defined based on the probability of developing active
TB (risk of infection) using two drivers. In section 5.3.2, the high risk patch is
defined by having an elevated direct first time transmission rate (β1 > β2 and δ1 =
δ2). Subsequently, in section 5.3.2 , the high risk patch is characterized by a higher
exogenous reinfection rate (δ1 > δ2 and β1 = β2). In addition, in an attempt to gain
a better understanding about the role of mobility, different scenarios with population
size heterogeneity among the two patches are explored. These scenarios are build up
by varying the population ratio (N1/N2). Particularly, it is assumed that Patch 1 is
the denser patch, as a result of social factors, while Patch 2 is assumed to be less
dense, more specifically, 1
2
N1 and
1
4
N1. In consequence, rates associated with the risk
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of infection are higher in Patch 1 when compared to the corresponding rates in Patch
2.
The role of risk as defined by direct first time transmission rates
In this subsection, the impact of heterogeneity on direct first time transmission rates
between patches are explored. Assuming Patch 1 has a higher risk of infection (β1 >
β2 so that R01 > 1), while Patch 2, in the absence of visitors would be unable to
sustain an epidemic (R02 < 1). Furthermore, the effect of different population ratios
(N1/N2) is also included and explored.
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Figure 5.8: Effect of Mobility for p12 = 0%, 3%, 6% and 9%, When Risk is Defined by
Direct First Time Transmission Rates 0.13 = β1 > β2 = 0.07 (R01 = 1.5, R02 = 0.8)
and δ1 = δ2 = 0.0026.
Figure 5.8 shows similar but contrasting effects on patch prevalence when different
residency times (mobility schemes) are explored (0% 3%, 6% and 9%). While Fig-
ure 5.8 shows the existence of mobility values (p12), capable of reducing the overall
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prevalence of the two patch system, it is important to notice the existence of mobility
patterns that would have a detrimental impact on the overall prevalence of the sys-
tem. Furthermore, it is observed that population densities just like residence times
have a noticeable effect on disease prevalence.
Interestingly, these results suggest that if individuals from Patch 1 increase their
residence time in Patch 2 (p12), this behavior would reduce TB prevalence in Patch
1, whiled increasing it in Patch 2. However, the number of total infected individuals
from both patches experiences a global beneficial effect for certain mobility patterns.
Figure 5.9, provides a better representation of mobility values (p12) and their im-
pact on TB prevalence at both the patch and at the system level. At the individual
patch level, similar trends as in Figure 5.8 are observed, but in this case the existence
of a threshold value can be observed for prevalence in terms of p12 (see red and yellow
curves in Figure 5.9), for which mobility is always beneficial. As a result, this suggests
that completely cordoning off infected regions may not be an effective control measure
for TB. On the other hand, as long as mobility between high risk and low-risk regions
is maintained above the critical value, mobility might become an important factor in
the control of TB.
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Figure 5.9: Effect of Mobility When Risk Is Defined by Direct First Time Trans-
mission Rates 0.13 = β1 > β2 = 0.07 (R01 = 1.5, R02 = 0.8) and δ1 = δ2 = 0.0026.
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Furthermore, it is suggested that when the riskier patch has the bigger population
size, the impact of mobility may turn out to be beneficial; results suggest that the
higher the ratio between population sizes, the higher the range of beneficial “traveling”
times (p12).
The impact of risk as defined by exogenous reinfection rates
Similarly, focusing on the impact exogenous reinfection has on the transmission dy-
namics of TB it is assumed that direct first time transmission rates are the same in
both patches (β1 = β2). In addition, it is assumed the disease has reached an endemic
state in both patches (R01 > 1 and R02 > 1). However, once again, Patch 1 remains
the riskier and consequently the exogenous reinfection rate in Patch 1 is higher than
that of Patch 2 (δ1 > δ2).
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Figure 5.10: Effect of Mobility for p12 = 0%, 20%, 40% and 60%, When Risk
Is Defined by the Exogenous Reinfection Rates 0.0053 = δ1 > δ2 = 0.0026 and
β1 = β2 = 0.1 (R01 = R02 = 1.155).
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As in the previous case, prevalence levels in Patch 1 are reduced by mobility (p12),
while prevalence in Patch 2 increase. Nevertheless, this prevalence reduction in Patch
1 is noticeable greater than the prevalence increment in Patch 2 for most mobility
values p12. Once again, Figure 5.10 suggests the existence of a threshold for which
mobility has a beneficial impact on the entire system. Furthermore, the effect of
population density once again could have a favorable impact on the total prevalence.
Figure 5.11 shows the mobility threshold and how it is impacted by population
density suggesting that mobility between two patches undergoing TB outbreaks with
high density heterogeneity (in which the riskier patch is denser) would result in lower
TB prevalence levels for the overall system.
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Figure 5.11: Effect of Mobility When Risk Is Defined by the Exogenous Reinfection
Rates 0.0053 = δ1 > δ2 = 0.0026 and β1 = β2 = 0.1 (R01 = R02 = 1.155).
Within this framework, parameters and scenarios, the simulations presented in
this section suggest that direct first time transmission plays a central role on TB
dynamics when mobility is considered. Although exogenous reinfection also reduces
the overall prevalence when mobility is incorporate, its not as important as the impact
generated by direct first time transmission.
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Figure 5.12: Effect of Mobility and Population Size Proportions on the Global Basic
Reproductive Number R0 When 0.13 = β1 > β2 = 0.07 and δ1 = δ2 = 0.0026.
Finally, Figure 5.12 depicts the relationship between population densities and
mobility (p12) with respect to the basic reproductive number R0. Notice that only
the first case was explored (direct first time transmission heterogeneity) suggesting
that mobility could indeed be an effective control measure capable of eliminating an
regional (active) TB outbreak.
5.4 Discussion
According to the World Health Organization (WHO) (World Health Organization,
2015), in 2014, 80% of reported TB cases occurred in 22 countries (all developing
countries). Efforts to control TB have been successful in many regions of the globe
and yet, 1.5 million people die annually. In consequence, TB, faithful to its history,
still poses one of the greatest challenges to global health (Daniel, 2006) and a threat
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to humanity. Recent reports suggest that established TB control measures have not
been adequately implemented, particularly in sub-Saharan countries (Andrews et al.,
2013; Chatterjee and Pramanik, 2015), one of the few regions heavily burdened by
TB. Even though rates have decreased in Brazil, relapse has become more important
than reinfection (de Oliveira et al., 2013; Luzze et al., 2013). Similarly, in Cape
Town, South Africa, a study (Verver et al., 2005) showed that in high incidence areas,
individuals who have received successful TB treatment and are no longer infectious are
at the highest risk of developing TB instead of being the most protected, suggesting
the existence of ignored mechanisms that might be driving the TB contagion (possibly
socio-economic factors).
The main focus of this study was on the role of ‘daily’ mobility within high and
low-risk areas, as well as, the potential impact of short-term mobility on TB dynamics
and control. A situation that is common in regions experiencing extreme levels of
social, economic and health disparities. Using a simplified framework, a two-patch
system, that captures, in a rather ‘dramatic’ way the dynamics between two close and
yet, distinct worlds (the world of the haves and the have nots) suggests the existence
of possible mechanisms, driven by social and economical factors, impacting disease
spread. Moreover, it is important to mention that since the main objective of this
study was to stress the impact of disparities, as a consequence, the highlighted results
(via the simulation) come from simplified extreme scenarios.
As expected, the model analysis suggests that the dynamics of TB depend on the
basic reproduction number (R0), which in turn is the function of model parameters
that includes the direct first transmission rate for a single patch system and residence
times for a two patch system. The simulations of specific extreme scenarios suggest
that short term mobility between heterogeneous patches does not always contributes
to overall increases in TB prevalence, to the contrary, in some cases it could be a
113
solution. The results show that when risk is considered only in terms of exogenous
reinfection, the global TB prevalence remains almost unchanged, compared to the ef-
fect of direct first transmission. In the case of a high risk direct first time transmission,
it is observed that mobile populations may pose detrimental effects on the prevalence
levels in both environments (patches) under certain mobility patterns. Simulations
show that when individuals from the risky population spend on average less than 25%
of their time in the safer patch the overall prevalence reaches its maximum. However,
if they spend more (p12 > 25%), the overall prevalence decreases. Further, in the
absence of exogenous reinfections, the model is robust and exhibits a sharp thresh-
old; the disease dies out or persists based on whether or not the basic R0 is below
or above unity, respectively. Although, the role of exogenous reinfection seems not
that relevant on overall prevalence when mobility is included, the fact remains that
such mode of transmission increases the risk that come from large displacement of
individuals, due to catastrophes or conflict, to TB-free areas.
Hence, policies that do not account for population heterogeneity and regional-
and community-specific factors are unlikely to be effective. It is clear that without
a basic understanding of the attributes of the communities in question, it is almost
impossible to successfully implement intervention programs capable of lowering rein-
fection rates for multiple pathways while at the same time maintain a low number of
drug resistant cases. It is paramount for intervention programs to educate the affected
populations and their government officials on the benefits, factors, and cost associated
with population-based TB prevention and control programs in order to make them
sustainable in the long run. At the same time, intervention must account for the
risks inherent with high levels of migration as well as with local and regional mobility
patterns between areas defined by high heterogeneity in TB risk and prevalence.
The ability to interpret information regarding the local origin of mobile individuals
114
accurately, would facilitate prompt responses in the face of initiation of an epidemic
or ideally help in the creation of a disease resilient community. In addition, during the
development and implementation of training and educational programs the necessity
to avoid stigmatizing and further marginalization of groups that may have already
experienced some kind of discrimination is essential, since it prevents integration,
reduces compliance and promotes isolation (Gushulak and MacPherson, 2000b). A
situation that cannot be ignored in today’s world where millions of refugees have been
dislocated and generated new migration patterns, as a result of armed conflicts. Fail-
ure to adequately incorporate and address these challenges may result in considerable
delays and consequently promotes the emergence of new diseases and the reemergence
of disease thought to be under control. As noted in (Feng et al., 2000), ignoring fac-
tors like exogenous reinfections, that is, establishing policies that focus exclusively on
the reproductive number R0, would amount to ignoring the role of dramatic changes
in initial conditions, now more common than before, due to the displacement of large
groups of individuals, the result of catastrophes and conflict.
5.5 Conclusions
This modeling study highlights critical social behaviors mechanisms that can fa-
cilitate or eliminate Tuberculosis infection in vulnerable populations. In particular,
it highlights the importance that factors like mobility, density and dominant modes
of transmission play an important role in the contagion process of Tuberculosis. The
results suggest that allowing infected individuals to move from high to low TB preva-
lence areas (where the sharing of treatment and isolation facilities is possible) may
lead to a reduction in the total TB prevalence in the overall (two-patch) population
under certain conditions. More specifically, an increase in mobility between the two
distinct risks regions produces a reduction on TB prevalence in the high risk patch
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(and a slightly increase in the low risk patch), while decreasing the total number
of infected individuals in both patches. Furthermore, when population size hetero-
geneity between patch 1 and patch 2 is large (N1 >> N2), mobility to the low risk
patch might provide global benefits in terms of low overall prevalence. Moreover,
the higher the ratio in population sizes between distinct risk patches, the larger the
benefit (under the same “traveling” pattern).
Finally, direct first time transmission seems to play a central role on TB dynamics
when mobility is incorporated. Nonetheless, mobility also reduces the overall preva-
lence, when exogenous reinfection is the dominant transmission pathway, however,
its impact on the prevalence is relatively small compared to the impact of direct first
time transmission.
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Chapter 6
DISCUSSION
Disease outbreaks, ranking from locally restricted to global pandemics, have been
reshaping the course of human society, even before humans became the dominant
species in this planet (Moodie, 1918). Due to their unquantifiable impact on both
economic and human capital, events such the black plague, the 1918 Spanish Flu
pandemic, and the recent Ebola outbreak are a few of the most devastating events in
history; based on their elevated numbers of disease induced deaths. Nonetheless, there
are many other events that without a doubt have been affecting specific communities
for decades and even centuries. Everything would point that seasonal epidemics in
a way are more impactful; due to the constant shock that they provide to already
burdened communities. Recent research points to the possible creation of poverty
traps as a result of these disease shocks. (Bonds et al., 2010) used a deterministic
approach in which they are able to analyze the impact of these outbreaks in the
economy of the region. Their results suggest that once a community fells into a
poverty tramp, the constant shocks of disease outbreaks make it almost impossible
to escape. Making disease burden one of the most complex and thus intractable
problems today.
As stated by (Perrings, 1991),
Many of the most intractable environmental problems are those in which
the use of environmental resources in novel ways has effects that are highly
uncertain in both their spread and duration. The greater the uncertainty
of the effects of technologically innovative use of the environmental re-
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sources, the greater is the difficulty in evaluating associated environmen-
tal damage or the marginal social cost. The wider and more durable the
environmental effects of economic activities are, the less is the scope of a
market solution involving the allocation of property rights. Problems of
uncertain environmental effects that may be global in spread or may en-
dure for generations require responses that go beyond existing evaluation
techniques.
It seems as if whenever a new solution is developed, the precautionary principle is not
taken into account. In essence, sequential decision making under uncertainty, usually
takes a cautious approach at first but then it may be relaxed as data sets are enriched
by experience; even when the probability of distant but potentially catastrophic dam-
age is admitted, but thought to be very low.
Similarly, Simon Levin in his address as the 2004 recipient of the Heineken award,
mentions social norms as a possible source of uncertainty not only in the use of
resources but in the way groups behave,
“A great challenge before us is thus to understand the dynamics of social
norms, how they arise, how they spread, how they are sustained and how
they change. Models of these dynamics have many of the same features
as models of epidemic spread, no great surprise, since many aspects of
culture have the characteristics of being social diseases. 1998 Heineken
award winner Paul Ehrlich and I have been directing our collective ener-
gies to this problem, convinced that it is as important to understand the
dynamics of the social systems in which we live as it is to understand the
ecological systems themselves. Understanding the links between individ-
ual behavior and societal consequences, and characterizing the networks
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of interaction and influence, create the potential to change the reward
structures so that the social costs of individual actions are brought down
to the level of individual payoffs. It is a daunting task, both because of
the amount we still must learn, and because of the ethical dilemmas that
are implicit in any form of social engineering. But it is a task from which
we cannot shrink, lest we squander the last of our diminishing resources.”
Consequently, any planning for enhancing community disease response, regardless
of the context, depends greatly in a highly heterogeneous process determined by the
involvement of individuals of such communities at all levels. It is clear that their
response to epidemic events do change the impact it has on the community and pub-
lic health infrastructure, as well as, its resources aimed at controlling such epidemic
events. Therefore, the development of disease resilience communities requires a col-
laborative and transparent process in which the tools for achieving disease resilience
are easily available for the individuals at the lower and most affected levels. In this
way, policies aimed at improving disease resilience can be customized to include in-
terventions that could impact the underlying vulnerability drivers specific to a region
or community.
In the case of many infectious diseases, the global aim at urbanization has in
part collaborated with the explosion of outbreaks across the globe. In consequence,
the need to have responsible urbanization, improved infrastructure, and appropriate
planning is essential in these urban areas. In addition, efficient policies that can take
into account a prompt response to disease shocks and incorporate the corresponding
health care infrastructure are desperately needed. Furthermore, the attributes of
the community associated with factors that could improve sanitation are likely to
be influential in reducing disease vulnerability dynamics of the community. Keep
in mind that these factors could include hard, soft infrastructure and environmental
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management.
Stages or components of disease vulnerability in a given community or the risk
of infection inherent to its inhabitants needs to be determined in the nearby future.
Some of the community components believed to be important are:
• Livelihood: inherent risk associated with existing abiotic and biotic factors. In
the case of vector borne diseases, this could be the impact caused by location
and the ability of the vectors and disease to efficiently complete their live cycle.
• Well-being: baseline statistics like nutrition, physical and mental health levels.
In the case of TB, nutrition seems to be an important once since this could cause
a negative impact in the immune response and thus facilitates progression from
latent to active TB.
• Self-protection: community self organization to prevent infections. This could
be measured as locally organized cleaning campaigns targeting nesting sites,
as well as the use of repellents and bed nets in the case of many vector borne
diseases.
• Social Protection: corresponding violence levels and local perception of safety
in each community.
• Governance: implementation and efficacy of control measures and the mainte-
nance of hard public health infrastructure.
While these are some factors that might have a direct impact on the risk of
infection, there are others that need to be investigated and then incorporated to the
Lagrangian modeling framework and estimate a more realistic impact of factors like
short-term mobility, the existing of contrasting risk communities, immunity or more
specific cross immunity from past outbreaks, and population size on past and recent
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epidemic outbreaks. At the same time, we are left puzzled by the methodology needed
in order to quantify the impact of these mechanisms or factors. How do we assess the
risk of infection in a given community? What kind of data do we need? What would
be some setbacks from this methods? Most importantly, what will be the impact of
these results? Would they be used as a reactionary policy or a preventive one?
In conclusion, as it was mentioned in (Moreno et al., 2017b), surveillance measures
must be improved...
Certainly, the use of dramatic measures to limit the spread of diseases like
SARS, Influenza or Ebola [(Chowell et al., 2003a; Herrera-Valdez et al.,
2011; Chowell et al., 2015)], as well as the rise of vector born diseases like
Dengue and Zika are not uncommon, and the dramatic implications that
some measures have had on local and global economies. The question
remains, what can we do to mitigate or limit the spread of disease, par-
ticularly emergent diseases without disrupting central components? Dis-
cussions on these issues are recurrent (Fenichel et al., 2011; Morin et al.,
2013), most intensely in the context of SARS, Influenza, Ebola and Zika,
in the last decade or so. The vulnerability of world societies is directly
linked to the lack of action in addressing the challenges faced by the weak-
est links in the system must be accepted and acted on by the world com-
munity. We need global investments in communities and nations where
health disparities and lack of resources are the norm. We must invest in
research and surveillance within clearly identified world hot spots, where
the emergence of new disease are most likely to emerge, and we must do so
with the involvement, at all levels, of the affected communities (Perrings
et al., 2014; Castillo-Chavez et al., 2015).
121
Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
While this study focuses on the dynamics of a single outbreak, the modeling frame-
work can be used to study long-term dynamics when the mobility patterns can be
captured effectively by P. A two-patch model where host-mobility is modeled us-
ing a Lagrangian approach is used to help understand the role of host-movement
on the transmission dynamics of ZIKV and TB. The patches were defined to be as
distinct as they could be, hoping that simulations, in this simplified system, could
capture some insight on the transmission dynamics of ZIKV and TB in the pres-
ence of extreme health disparities within neighboring communities or within urban
centers. This framework can be used to study the dynamics of vector born diseases
within a collection of neighboring communities or neighborhoods experiencing multi-
ple levels of health disparities and diverse connectivity mobility structures (Bichara
and Castillo-Chavez, 2016). The study of the role of mobility at larger scales can be
best captured using question-specific related models that account for the possibility
of long-term mobility (see for example (Herrera-Valdez et al., 2011; Chowell et al.,
2003b; Baroyan et al., 1971; Rvachev and Longini Jr, 1985; Elveback et al., 1976;
Banks and Castillo-Chavez, 2003; Khan et al., 2009)).
The incorporation of a Lagrangian modeling approach to study epidemic outbreaks
makes it possible to use measurable parameters like risk of infection (βˆ), which affect
individuals differently depending on patch-residency and mobility patterns (residency
times). As expected, the impact of mobility on the final epidemic size depends on
the local risk of infection and population size. Moreover, it was also determined
122
that there are certain cases in which mobility could be detrimental, highlighting the
necessity to reduce health disparities in vulnerable communities. On the other hand,
mobility from high to low risk patches can reduce or increase the total final epidemic
size; under such conditions, mobility could be used as a strategy to ameliorate the
impact of disease outbreaks. Furthermore, population size matters; differences in
population density (size) were also shown to be capable of generating reductions on
the total final epidemic size within some mobility regimes. Nonetheless, examples
when R0i < 1 with mobility incapable of reducing the total final epidemic size under
no differences in patch density (here measured by total population size in each patch,
both assumed to have roughly the same area) were also identified.
In this dissertation, the role of heterogeneity as captured in a Lagrangian setting
was explored. While this modeling perspective simplifies the modeling of communi-
cable and vector born diseases, it is not sufficient to divide a population in just two
groups (high and low risk), in order to capture the levels of heterogeneity observed
in real societies. There is indeed a gradient of risks that must be considered, but
the question then becomes: how many levels will be enough? A question that has
no simple answers albeit the right level of aggregation to capture the dynamics of
realistic systems must be addressed when the goal is to implement policies generated
by these models in realistic settings.
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